Iran: EU sanctions may backfire

By Andrew Beatty

Date: 06/10/05

Vladimir Chizhov, Russia's ambassador to the EU, said this week that if Iran crossed certain 'red lines' it would face referral to the United Nations Security Council.

Withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty, he said, was just one such red line. While his comments point to an acceptance in Moscow that Iran's actions cannot go unchecked by the international community, they are still some way from Russia demanding the same 'objective guarantees' that the EU and US are demanding of Iran.

Nevertheless, they indicate that Iran may be closer to facing international sanctions than it may like to think.

Indian support for Iran, and that of the non-aligned countries, is now looking shaky at best. India shocked the Iranian leaders, and many others, by splitting the non-aligned movement when it voted for a EU-sponsored resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to refer Iran to the Security Council for failing to comply with nuclear non-proliferation rules. And now Tehran's closest European ally, Russia, is willing to countenance economic sanctions. The leaders of the EU have this week stepped up pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to back Iran's referral to the Security Council, during an EU-Russia summit in London (4 October).

Tehran is no doubt also surprised that the EU has held firm in its calls for UN referral. But if stopping Iran from using a nuclear energy programme as a veil for acquiring nuclear weapons is the aim of the international community, are sanctions the way to go?

While the imminent imposition of economic sanctions would undoubtedly make Iranian decision-makers face up to a choice - "nukes or butter", as author Kenneth Pollack puts it - gaining consensus for substantial bars on trade and investment is likely to prove difficult. Even the EU would be affected by substantial sanctions, which would include oil.

In 2004 the EU, by far Iran's largest trade partner, imported Iranian products worth €8 billion. But 80% of the EU's imports from Iran are oil products.

Garnering support among EU member states and among reluctant international partners for substantial sanctions would prove difficult, if not impossible. Long before the most recent Iraq war, moderate US foreign policy experts such as Richard Haass were questioning the efficacy of economic sanctions as a diplomatic tool.

Such sanctions would undoubtedly play badly in Iran, disproportionately affecting ordinary Iranians and isolating what moderate voices may remain. US-style sanctions are also likely to result in Brussels finding itself in the same position as Washington has been in since the Islamic Revolution: vilified, with little means of leveraging influence in Tehran. Any chance of engaging with the Iranian regime could thus be spoiled.

Full-blown sanctions are likely to result in Iran abandoning diplomacy altogether and perhaps stepping up its asymmetrical warfare and support for international terrorism.

The regime in Tehran could invest more energy in fighting the West and Israel via Hezbollah and other groups. However, the political process now under way in Lebanon and Syria may undermine popular support for such groups and limit their ability to act.

Yet lighter sanctions are less likely to create a tipping point in Tehran, convincing a critical mass of those in the regime who want to acquire nuclear weapons that the cost of obtaining them is too high.

Sanctions that do not include oil would not hurt Tehran and are unlikely to achieve their aim.

With the international non-proliferation regime at stake, the EU faces some tough choices.

Nuclear facts

• France, Germany and the UK (EU3) have engaged Iran in talks since December 2004, after Iran broke its October 2003 promise to suspend enrichment activities.
• The EU3's strategy is to offer Iran economic incentives in turn for assurances of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
• On 16 June, the IAEA announced Iran's failure to disclose information concerning its plutonium activities. Iran had earlier stated that its plutonium experiments ended in 1993. But IAEA investigations, which started in 2002, revealed that reprocessing experiments took place in 1995 and 1998.

Analysis feature in which the author suggests that economic sanctions against Iran, which refuses to abandon its nuclear enrichment programme, would be unlikely to reach their aim.