Improving policy implementation in an enlarged European Union. The case of national regulatory authorities

Book abstract:

One dilemma for the European Union (EU), as this book explains, is that national authorities are not administering its rules consistently. Despite widespread agreement on the rules throughout Europe, they are actually implemented with varying degrees of efficiency within the Member States. The book aims to demonstrate that this problem might be resolved by ascribing greater power and autonomy to the countries in question, but combining this with making them more accountable to National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). The rationale behind this is that states require a degree of political independence and flexibility in order to meet the demands of a volatile market place. To this end, the writers explore the institutional arrangements and suitability of Member States and accession countries for NRAs, assessing the ways and means of making each country more accountable. The methods proposed are performance appraisals and peer reviews, which have the aim of ensuring each member state uses its discretionary powers appropriately.

The book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one, by way of introduction, assesses the policy implementation 'deficit' in terms of EU expansion, and chapter two considers the problems of delegation, agencies, and the implementation of EU law. In chapter three, there is a discussion of the Principal-Agent Theory, and chapter four situates this theory in the context of economic integration. Chapter five provides work on EU rules and obligations of the NRAs, chapter six examines regulatory structures in both the member states and candidate countries, and chapter seven looks at the question of reducing the policy implementation deficit in an enlarged EU. Chapter eight presents conclusions on the issues and problems raised.