How to make Barroso Commission deliver

Date: 08/07/04

THE acrimony surrounding the appointment of a new president of the European Commission has shown that the EU's government leaders are unfit to steer the course of the enlarged Union on major political issues. One lesson can be drawn from this disappointing record: the EU needs a stronger Commission.

The executive's performance depends both on the approach that national governments take to EU integration and its internal organization. In order to be an effective interlocutor with member states, able to make their interests converge, the Commission must get its own house in order. Ensuring that a College of 25 members is operational, cohesive and proactive should be the main priority of the new president when planning the organization of his team between now and 1 November. Central to this debate is the way in which responsibilities are allocated and whether or not groups of commissioners should be established under the coordination of a vice-president or "super-commissioner".

President-elect José Manuel Barroso should not bend under pressure from governments of large member states wanting to gain important briefs. He should not discuss portfolios at all before outlining the broad guidelines of a political programme. The identification of portfolios and their allocation should flow from that. The next few weeks should be dedicated to the definition of the political priorities that will guide the work of the next Commission. Such a programme should be presented to the European Parliament on 22 July and should be the basis for the confirmation vote that the assembly will take.

In the light of these policy priorities, Barroso should decide how many vice-presidents he would appoint and what their tasks should be. The answers to these questions are closely linked to the envisaged creation of groups of commissioners, or "clusters". Various options are at hand.

The "minimalist" approach is to tinker with the present structure of the Commission. Vice-presidents would hold the most important portfolios, notably economic policy and external relations. Horizontal functions, such as coordination of related policy domains or inter-institutional relations, could also be defined and entrusted to individual commissioners. Ad hoc clusters could be set up, on a temporary basis, to address urgent matters or to define major policy initiatives. This scenario provides a certain degree of flexibility in the functioning of the Commission. It would also allow the president to exercise his authority over individual commissioners. The larger Commission would continue meeting on a weekly basis, which would help build a team spirit among the members of the College.

But the allocation of important portfolios to vice-presidents, most of whom would likely come from large member states, could sap the power of the president, squeezed between heavyweights. The consequence of such a scenario could be the much-feared two-tier Commission - at least in practice.

Supporters of the "maximalist" option would like to see a better-defined internal structure of the Commission, building permanent clusters around key policy priorities. Four or five vice-presidents would chair weekly meetings of groups of commissioners and set their agendas. Under this scenario, weekly meetings of the entire College would not be required. Vice-presidents would report to the president on a weekly basis and the latter would have the power to call extraordinary meetings of the College when needed.

Whether the creation of clusters of commissioners would strengthen or weaken the College does, however, crucially depend on the functions of the clusters and on the powers granted to vice-presidents.

The attribution of key portfolios to vice-presidents, in addition to their function of coordinating other commissioners, would risk giving them too much power and would undermine the control of the president over the Commission. That would pave the way for "collective", as opposed to "individual", fiefdoms. In particular, this would be the case if the groups of commissioners were entrusted with decision-making powers, with little scope for consultation between different clusters. That would pre-empt collegial responsibility.

On the other hand, several intermediate options can be envisaged, reconciling the need for efficient policymaking with collegial responsibility under the leadership of the president.

The suggestion of Ideas Factory Europe - in Reworking the Commission - is that vice-presidents could be given horizontal, coordinating competences, but would not have vertical competences for core policies. They would be entrusted with less important portfolios in addition to the responsibility of driving the work of four or five groups of commissioners.

Vice-presidents would have a direct interest in ensuring that the groups delivered, since that would be their only power base. The groups' mandates could be defined in narrower terms. They could be in charge of long-term planning, preparing policy initiatives and overseeing their follow-up and implementation, whereas decisions would be left to the College.

The full College should meet only twice a month to discuss major political decisions and to strike deals when disagreement prevents the adoption of decisions by a group in its weekly meetings. Rules can be devised to allow for coordinated policymaking between groups and for matters to be referred to the "plenary" of the Commission.

The prophets of the inexorable decline of the Commission can still be proven wrong, but the margin for manoeuvre is very tight.

In just a few weeks, president-elect Barroso will have to define the political priorities of the College, win Parliament's confidence, allocate portfolios to commissioners, select reliable vice-presidents and establish rules of procedure that will enhance the faltering political cohesion of the Commission. Looking at the meagre achievements of the last two years, national governments would be well advised to provide him with the staunchest support, in their own interest.

• Giovanni Grevi is associate director of studies with the European Policy Centre and coordinator of Ideas Factory Europe. He writes here in a personal capacity.

Writer argues that the EU needs a stronger European Commission and examines how the new Commission President, José might achieve this goal.