How electoral competition explains preference convergence and divergence in pre-electoral coalitions

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Series Details 06.04.17
Publication Date 06/04/2017
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While most coalition governments form after the results of an election, some parties choose to announce their intention to form pre-electoral coalitions before a vote has been held. Based on a recent study, Zachary Greene and Matthias Haber explore why parties, which are usually in direct conflict with one another for electoral support, choose to engage in this kind of cooperation. Their findings highlight that close competitors can often use their electoral context to mutual advantage and that parties do not always benefit from strictly adversarial approaches.

Source Link Link to Main Source http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/06/how-electoral-competition-explains-preference-convergence-and-divergence-in-pre-electoral-coalitions/
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