Governing with judges. Constitutional politics in Europe

Book abstract:

The author, Alec Stone Sweet, sets out in this book to explain certain deep transformations in governance that have resulted from the establishment of enforceable constitutions in Europe. Focusing on the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the European Union, the book examines the sources and consequences of the pan-European movement to confer constitutional review authority on a new governmental institution - the constitutional court. Detailed case studies illustrate how, and to what extent, legislative processes have been placed under the influence of constitutional judges. In a growing number of policy domains these judges function as powerful adjunct legislators. As constitutional courts have consolidated their position as authoritative interpreters of the constitutional law, and especially of human rights provisions, the work of the judiciary, too, has been constitutionalized. Stone Sweet argues that constitutional adjudication constructs complex causal linkages between rule systems and normativity, on the one hand, and the strategic behaviour of individuals, on the other. He also addresses central questions raised by a wide-range of ongoing theory projects including the 'new institutionalism', rational choice, principal-agent theories of delegation, and the new constitutionalism in Continental legal theory.

Alec Stone Sweet is Official Fellow in Politics and Chair in Comparative Government, Nuffield College, Oxford University. His scholarly book is appropriate for use in classrooms at undergraduate and graduate levels.