Getting it right is no longer just an option

Date: 20/06/1996

WHEN, in March last year, the European Parliament voted to throw out a proposal which had been carefully negotiated between

MEPs, the Commission and EU member

states, observers were divided as to its implications for future decision-making in the Union.

On the one hand, it was viewed as a brilliant political move by the Parliament, demonstrating its increased self-confidence vis-à-vis the other institutions. On the other, it was regarded as a major tactical blunder providing the best example to date of MEPs' “irresponsible” behaviour. Whatever the case, the surprise vote served to focus attention both on the Parliament's increased powers and on the way it seeks to use them.

Until now, treaty changes have appeared to bring about, almost by right, greater decision-making powers for the Parliament. Such a trend was perhaps inevitable given public concerns about the 'democratic deficit' in the EU and the feeling that this could be most readily addressed by giving MEPs further powers of control and scrutiny over the Commission and Council of Ministers.

The accountability issue has not gone away - if anything it has recently become more pronounced - but the idea of 'ever more powers to the Parliament' as the panacea for all the Union's institutional ills is now coming under closer examination.

MEPs, of course, are more than ever aware of the need to explain and justify their role to a poorly-informed outside world and their prise de conscience is heightened precisely because the Parliament's increased powers have brought with them greater responsibilities.

The growing interest of the media, industry lobbies and pressure groups in the Parliament's work is also helping to shape the debate on how MEPs should conduct their affairs.

The Parliament's co-decision power with the Council enables it ultimately to reject proposals in key policy areas. This has not only emboldened MEPs to flex their muscles more with the Commission and the Council, but, just as importantly, it has made them increasingly concerned about “getting it right”.

The experience of 'conciliation' within the co-decision procedure is bringing together for the first time delegates from the Parliament and member states to thrash out compromises on contested issues in private. MEPs are now paying greater attention to doing their homework in advance and striving for consistency with their previously-stated positions.

Consistency is, in fact, a major problem which still dogs Euro MPs. Examples abound where the Parliament contradicts itself - a situation to which MEPs appear resigned as the price to be paid for “democracy in action”.

They will argue that in an institution of 626 members from 15 countries working in 11 languages and representing well over 100 national parties, a coherent result cannot always be achieved. It is difficult not to sympathise with this argument, but the Parliament's credibility can nonetheless be jeopardised in the process.

As for the Parliament's evolving role vis-à-vis the Commission and Council, there are signs that MEPs now have more realistic ambitions for themselves. In its submission to the Intergovernmental Conference, the Parliament did not seek a formal right of initiative alongside the Commission, preferring instead to focus on the extension of its co-decision powers to new policy areas.

It would, in any event, claim that it has a de facto power to influence new policy directions through 'own-initiative' reports, recommendations contained in its amendments to Commission proposals, its opinions on consultative papers and action programmes and, last but not least, the prudent use of Article 138b of the Maastricht Treaty which empowers the Parliament to “request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing this treaty”.

Similarly, it has not made a huge fuss about the French and British attempt to exclude it from the centre of the IGC negotiations. Although originally irritated, the Parliament has settled for a formula which entitles it to regular exchanges of views with IGC participants. For the moment, at least, the formula appears to be working.

If the IGC were ultimately to accede to the notion that co-decision be applied to more policy areas, then MEPs would be the undisputed beneficiary.

Thus the Parliament would extend its policy-shaping role at a time when new policy initiatives emanating from the Commission under co-decision (essentially, but not exclusively, single market measures) are decreasing.

Furthermore, the Parliament feels that, in order to sustain and build on the relatively new-found respect it has acquired, it must be seen to be negotiating with both the Commission and Council on more or less equal terms.

However, MEPs' sphere of influence is destined to grow irrespective of both the number of proposals coming under their scrutiny and of any further powers the IGC may or may not confer upon the Parliament.

There are two key reasons for this. The first of these concerns the Union's budget. In themselves, of course, the Parliament's budget powers are nothing new. What is new is that the proportion of the EU's annual budget on which MEPs effectively have the final say - non-compulsory expenditure - is growing and is now rapidly approaching 50&percent;, largely as a result of the decreasing slice of (compulsory) expenditure devoted to the Common Agricultural Policy and of the development of new policy areas demanding significant and additional funds.

As the EU budget expands, MEPs' powers will grow apace. Similarly, their budgetary control function has become both extremely effective and more visible, due in part to their increased flair for publicity, which has made the Parliament stand out as a fierce budgetary watchdog.

Secondly, the Parliament is now turning its old reputation as being nothing more than a talking shop to its own advantage. In this new era of consultation and dialogue in the EU, it is providing a forum for discussion not only between MEPs but between players in the wider world.

The Parliament is developing a unique role, not only in organising a debate on all manner of issues of current interest, but also, when it is sympathetic, of channelling the views it picks up to help shape future policy-making.

To see the Parliament simply in terms of its work in plenary sessions and committees is seriously to miss the point. Its hearings, cross-party discussion groups, industry specific fora, committees of enquiry and the like, although of variable quality and usefulness, nonetheless point increasingly to the Parliament as the EU institution which is the best placed to listen to, and reflect, outside interests in the broadest sense of the term.

This role is not, of course, laid down in the treaty, nor is it likely to be codified in the IGC process, but it will ultimately give the Parliament one of its main sources of legitimacy.

The biggest obstacle to further enhancing the status of the Parliament is not the attempts by member states to claw back sovereignty nor the Commission jealously guarding its own formal powers, but MEPs themselves.

The notion of getting it right from now on is not just one option amongst many. It is an absolute necessity. The standing of the Parliament has never been higher, but never has it been more under the spotlight: mesdames et messieurs les parlementaires, à vous de jouer!

Paul Adamson, founder of the European public affairs consultancy, Adamson Associates, is chairman of the EU Committee of the British Chamber of Commerce in Belgium.