France’s EU referendum. That damned, elusive constitution

A French no should not be treated as a big crisis for the European Union

IF YOU put something to the vote, it is foolish to predict that there will be a huge crisis if you lose. Unfortunately, Europe's leaders tend to be foolish, as the current hysteria about a possible French no to the EU's constitutional treaty on May 29th shows. Indeed, when some assert that a no will mean the end of Europe, one wonders not just about their judgment but about their belief in democracy. One aim of this constitution was to bring the EU closer to ordinary people. If the people choose to reject the result, should they be blamed - or the leaders who tried to sell them such an incomprehensible text?

As it happens, there are four weeks to go before the vote in France. Despite a string of negative polls, a yes remains possible. But there are at least eight referendums to come after this one, including a Dutch one three days later. To anybody but Europe's foolish leaders, this should make it obvious that they need to think of an alternative: a plan B. And it is equally obvious what such a plan B should be. If the present text proves unacceptable, the EU must go away and produce another that is shorter, simpler and sets out the distribution of powers more clearly - and is thus more readily saleable to voters.

At this point, yes campaigners raise a fundamental objection. The trouble, they say, is that voters in different countries have different, conflicting (and often extraneous) concerns. Some would prefer deeper integration and a more “social” Europe; others want less centralisation and more liberal economics. The constitution was a compromise among these views, and any attempt to negotiate a new one will be a similar compromise - which would run into the same ratification problem as today's. Besides, voters who are against the constitution because they dislike their governments, or because they don't want Turkey in the EU, will vote against anything.

Yet it is hard to accept this defeatist case that nothing can be done to produce a better and more easily saleable constitution. And in fact, two common threads can be detected among most naysayers. One is disaffection with Brussels, and a preference for more national freedom (whether to be liberal or social) from EU diktats. The second is for a simpler and shorter document than the 500-plus-page behemoth that has been dumped on voters' doorsteps. Like the aim of bringing the EU closer to its people, simplification was a forgotten part of the 2001 Laeken declaration that led to the constitution.

The dangers of the “hard core”

This being the EU, the shock of a no, especially one from France, is more likely to lead to inaction (and recrimination) than to redrafting. No harm in that: a pause for reflection may help. The EU can keep working on the basis of the Nice and earlier treaties. A return to the drawing-board would still be desirable, as the EU needs a better constitution to clarify its distribution of powers. But inaction would be better than some alternatives, such as turning inwards to create a hard core of true believers in closer integration. Plans like these are dangerous because they might put at risk one of the EU's greatest achievements, and at a critical moment: its enlargement to embrace the neighbours.

One year on from the enlargement that took in eight countries from central Europe last May, the EU has contracted a dose of “enlargement fatigue”. Indeed, the disillusionment with Brussels that is driving so many French voters to say no to the constitution is linked to past (and future) enlargements. Many in France have come, illogically, to blame the new central European members for stealing their jobs and investment: for delocalisation in the popular word. For similar reasons, but also for fear of Islam, even more are deeply averse to plans to admit the biggest applicant of all, Turkey.

Doubts over enlargement are misplaced. Because it brings in more dynamic economies with, in Turkey's case, a growing population, enlargement is good for the EU, as well as for the new members. It also fosters peace and prosperity on the EU's borders: consider the past year's changes in Ukraine, in part inspired by hopes of one day joining. There is no reason why a no to the constitution should stop or slow down the EU's expansion: as the yes campaign in France has grown hoarse explaining, Turkey, which will not join for a decade, has nothing to do with it. It would be a great blunder if Europe's foolish leaders allowed a no vote to derail their commitment to admit more new members, especially to begin membership negotiations with Turkey in early October.

Editorial argues that a French 'no' in the referendum on the European Constitution should not be treated as a big crisis for the European Union.