France, Germany and the reinvention of Europe. Fudge rarely works / Restarting the Franco-German motor

Date: 18/01/03

Fudge rarely works

The latest compromise presented by France and Germany is a recipe for confusion

IT IS apposite that the latest attempt by France and Germany to reinvent Europe should be celebrated in the wondrous hall of mirrors in the ill-fated palace of Versailles. The spectacle of the entire membership of both Germany's and France's lower houses of parliament due to gather there next week in an atmosphere of amity should stir the hearts of everyone who desires peace and prosperity in the world. But the notion, heralded in Paris and Berlin this week, that the two nations have agreed upon a common vision of Europe's future is as illusory as the images of grandeur reflected in that glorious glassy enfilade over the centuries past. The latest Franco-German plan to reform the European Union smacks of the sort of compromise that creates more mirage than clarity.

For sure, goodwill between the two ancient rivals must be applauded. The foundation of peace in western Europe that has been unshaken for more than a half a century - a peerless record - was hewn by far-sighted and big-hearted Frenchmen and Germans, albeit with help from generous Americans and others, and has been fortified by the emergence of the EU alongside the protective carapace of NATO. But those whose vision of peace generated a desire for ever closer union between Europe's nations have become victims of their own success. A club soon to number 25 countries, with new ones from central Europe, can no longer be driven just by a Franco-German motor. As Europe has changed shape since communism fizzled, new differences have emerged. France, in the end, is still a country that believes in having its own foreign policy (witness its divergence with Germany over Iraq) and in a Europe of nations. Germany tends to believe in a nation of Europe - and in ever closer union.

This dichotomy was highlighted by the muddled suggestion, put forward this week in the two countries' joint name, that the European Commission, which ought really to be a civil service, albeit one with powers to initiate legislative ideas, should have a president elected by Europe's parliament, to give it more legitimacy and clout. To compound the muddle, it was also suggested, as the other half of the bargain, that the European Council, where the ministers of elected governments of all the member-countries meet, should have an elected president, to assert a collective authority for Europe's nations. Having two elected presidents would certainly balance powers, but it is surely a recipe for conflict, stalemate or just confusion. It also threatens to replicate the current ambiguity over who runs Europe's foreign policy, insofar as it has one: an external-affairs boss within the commission (currently Chris Patten) or a “high representative” designated by the EU's component governments (Javier Solana).

This latest compromise may carry weight at the convention in Brussels where a constitutional blueprint is in draft. The French and Germans would like, in Versailles, to herald its progress. Its laudable aim is to enhance clarity, democracy and efficiency within the EU, especially as it expands to take in new members. Plainly a battle is still in swing between those, led by the Germans, who want tighter integration, in economic (including tax) matters and in foreign policy too, and those, led by Britain, with Spain alongside, who want looser arrangements. France, on the face of things, has bowed this week to German wishes to bolster the commission as a motor of integration. Yet the nation-staters, who must still count France among their number, are well in contention. A bigger voice for the European Council helps their cause. By contrast, the latest awkward compromise would, in essence, produce a two-headed beast. Europe is already, necessarily, a hybrid. But even a hybrid needs to know who is in charge.

Restarting the Franco-German motor

The latest Franco-German agreement on the future of Europe causes consternation in Brussels and relief in London

IT WILL be a rendezvous laden with history. On January 22nd the entire membership of the Bundestag, Germany's lower house of parliament, will travel to Versailles to reaffirm Franco-German friendship. The last time so many German dignitaries visited the palace en masse was in 1871 - to witness Bismarck's proclamation of a German empire following the crushing defeat of France by the Prussians. (And among those present was a young officer, Paul von Hindenburg, who, 62 years later, was to appoint Hitler as chancellor.) In 1919 the Germans returned to Versailles, this time as a defeated nation, to sign a treaty that Hitler later swore to overturn.

But the reason for next week's Franco-German get-together is altogether happier. For it marks the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, a historic pledge of Franco-German friendship. The treaty's signature in 1963 came just eight days after General de Gaulle, then France's president, first vetoed Britain's bid to join the European Economic Community. It established the idea that France and Germany, above all others, would drive Europe towards integration. Ever since, the Franco-German motor has indeed set the pace, in particular by creating a single currency, the euro. Next week the French and Germans will sign a batch of agreements on closer political co-operation, including occasional joint cabinet meetings, to reassert their partnership's centrality to Europe's future.

Jacques Chirac, France's president, is fond of remarking that the Franco-German relationship is not intended to exclude anyone. It is simply, he says, that without agreement between France and Germany, the European Union cannot work. True enough - but it all depends what you mean by work. The latest Franco-German deal on the Union's constitutional future, stitched together at a dinner chez Mr Chirac at the Elysee Palace on January 14th, seems likely to provide the blueprint for a European constitution currently being debated at an EU convention in Brussels.

It will certainly be pored over at next week's session of the convention. France and Germany have indeed once again pre-empted the decisions of the Union's 13 other governments and given the impetus to make Europe “work”. But the deal is a messy compromise that may well make it harder for the EU to work as an institution.

The problem is that France and Germany have different visions of how power should be wielded within the EU. The French have argued for a new post of president of the European Council, the EU body which brings together heads of governments. That implies a vision of the EU where European policy is essentially a series of bargains between governments. The Germans, in contrast, have promoted the idea of a more powerful president of the European Commission, the EU's supra-national executive, which regards itself as a European government in embryo.

So, rather than endorse one vision or another, the Franco-German couple has compromised by plumping for both. The council will get a president elected by the heads of governments - for five years or two terms (at most) of two-and-a-half years each. But the commission would henceforth have its president elected by the European Parliament, an idea meant to strengthen his legitimacy - and his power. The fear is that the result will, simply, be confusion - with the two presidents glowering at each other from edifices on opposite sides of the Rue de la Loi in Brussels.

Boo hoo for the federalists?

Joschka Fischer, Germany's foreign minister, made it clear that as a devoted federalist he is less than delighted with the deal. Keen integrationists in Brussels, who had felt in recent weeks that things were moving their way, are also alarmed. Andrew Duff, a prominent member of the convention, calls the latest Franco-German deal “a potentially disastrous recipe for internal confusion and external cacophony”. Many of the smaller EU countries are also uneasy. The “smalls” generally prefer the idea of an EU in which the European Commission calls the shots, fearing that the alternative is a Union of bigger countries stitching up deals between themselves and imposing them on the rest.

The British government, by contrast, is relieved. In recent months a series of Franco-German deals had revived British fears of being sidelined by a Franco-German push for a federal Europe. One such notable deal has delayed reform of Europe's common agricultural policy by several years. Others have laid out ideas for harmonising taxes and for defence co-operation within the EU. German suggestions that the post of president of the commission should be combined with that of president of the council - meaning that the commission's president would chair meetings of national governments - were denounced by a British minister as creating a “kaiser” to preside over Europe.

That France has succeeded in persuading Germany to accept a stand-alone president of the European Council - an idea also eagerly promoted by Britain's Tony Blair - is regarded as a victory in London. The Franco-German proposal to create a European foreign minister also seems acceptable to the British, since this new superminister would be based primarily in the council rather than the commission.

But British relief at not facing a renewed Franco-German federalist cavalry charge may have to be qualified. The French and the Germans have also agreed to introduce majority voting in the making of a common European foreign policy. The French say that, if military force is involved or if a vital national interest is at stake, foreign policy will not be decided by majority vote. So European countries would still go their own way if these rules were to be applied, for instance, to the conflict with Iraq. But the Germans respond that an invocation of national interest could still be overruled by a majority vote of heads of government. Whatever the final arrangement, the drift is towards closer integration.

In the long run, the federalists will comfort themselves with the belief that history and logic will bring them victory in the end. They point out that the creation of a European foreign minister follows the failure of the current arrangement of two jobs - one based in the commission and the other in the council. The creation of two rival European presidents replicates this arrangement. If it fails, the option of uniting the two jobs and creating a “kaiser for Europe” remains. The ghost of Bismarck may still hover over next week's celebrations in Versailles.

Editorial and feature looks at the joint Franco-German proposals submitted to the Convention on the Future of Europe. Editorial calls them a recipe for confusion.

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