‘Foreign funding’ in post-revolution Tunisia

Tunisia’s Islamist-led government is in a tight spot. The country’s first free and fair elections to choose representatives to the National Constituent Assembly (NAC) in September 2011 resulted in the overwhelming victory of the Islamist Ennahda party, which eventually formed the incumbent ‘troika’ coalition government with the leftist parties Ettakatol and Congress for the Republic (CPR). Since then, with Nidaa Tounes, an electoral coalition of different opposition parties has emerged which for the first time bears the potential of challenging Islamist hegemony. Tunisian voters are frustrated with the slow pace of government delivery, and Ennahda’s organisational head-start over other political formations is gradually narrowing.

The coming elections – the date of which is still pending at the time of writing – will potentially hold the troika accountable. Polls suggest a nip-and-tuck race between Ennahda and Nidaa. For the first time, genuine electoral competition may enter Tunisia’s political arena.

In this tense political context, the ways in which external forces might try to influence the course of events is the subject of heated debate. Countless rumours, media scandals and mutual accusations among political actors illustrate how sensitive an issue ‘foreign funding’ is and how it is seen as part of a suspected external conspiracy plot. The fragile governance that characterises transition processes provides opportunities for political actors to fill the void
and place their favourites, and foreign assistance to promote specific local actors, themes or agendas may be perceived as a threat.

No matter how justified, fears of uncontrollable external forces buying local influence over a political process, potentially ‘high-jacking’ the gains of a heavily-paid popular revolution, are serious. International actors wishing to assist democratic development in such a context must be highly-sensitive to such fears and perceptions, which directly affect the potential impact of their programmes.

In post-revolution Tunisia, ‘political’ foreign assistance is a novelty. Under Ben Ali, approximately 9,000 associations worked throughout the country, but their activities were largely limited to social and cultural issues. Under the law, associations were prohibited from undertaking ‘political’ activities, and – with a few notable exceptions – formal registration was denied to organisations working on themes such as human rights. The work of the few registered and unregistered organisations active in ‘political’ fields was heavily constrained by the regime’s repressive apparatus.

Conversely, international donors, themselves forced to operate within tight constraints, shunned work on more political affairs and concentrated instead on social and economic issues. Aside from the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), the number of political parties was limited to eight legally-registered opposition parties, which were heavily controlled by the regime and stood no chance in any electoral competition.