Finally, a state they can call their own

Declaring independence does not mean that Kosovo will become a state overnight, writes Toby Vogel.

Kosovo's declaration of independence on Sunday (17 February) means that Kosovars now have their own state, but it does not mean that this state is working well. And it may not really be theirs.

EU governments, including those which support Kosovo's independence, believe that the country is too divided to ensure equity between its Albanian majority of well over 90% and its minorities, above all its Serbs.

The EU therefore wants to implement the so-called Ahtisaari plan with its provisions for local self-rule and minority protection. In order to succeed in this task, the EU-led International Civilian Office (ICO) needs executive powers.

The ICO is to take over from UNMIK, the United Nations interim administration in Kosovo, after a transition period of 120 days. Thus, in mid-June, Kosovo will become the EU's ward.

This annoys Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), a Berlin-based think-tank, which has for years criticised similar arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Kosovo's current UN administration, which has managed the territory since 1999, may have lost all legitimacy with Kosovo's population, but simply replacing it with the ICO will not change much, Knaus believes. He says that the international presence is set up in a way that will make it "open-ended". An international administration with strong decision-making powers would perpetuate the new country's dependence on the international community, he says, as it would delay the development of a local political class capable of managing the country.

But when Christian Schwarz-Schilling, an ESI patron and a German diplomat, became the international community's high representative in Sarajevo in January 2006, he quickly gambled away all credibility his office still had and gave free rein to venal local politicians by refusing to intervene. His successor, Miroslav Lajcÿ‡k, had to work hard to get the reform process back on track, but Bosnia lost more than a year in its drive for closer links with the EU.

Does the experience of Bosnia not suggest that international supervisors need executive powers?

What may be more important, according to a seminal study in the field, is a political strategy for state-building.

Richard Caplan, professor of international relations at Oxford University, in his book 'International Governance of War-Torn Territories', argues that international territorial administration of the kind practised in Bosnia and Kosovo is broader and more political than more traditional peace operations. This demands an approach for which the EU, with its tendency to shun anything overtly political, may be ill-suited.

The EU has put much thought into planning the ICO and Eulex, its 1,800-strong rule-of-law mission. But the enormity of the task of supervising Kosovo's independence is perhaps only now fully visible. In consequence, attention is shifting to the mechanics of state-building - the little things that make up a functioning state.

One proof that Kosovo is not ready for full independence is that almost nine years after the UN took over, many public services are still managed by international bodies.

Air traffic control at Pristina's international airport is run by the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit. Visitors are received by UN immigration and customs officers (to be replaced, in due course, by EU and domestic staff).

The 'state' in Kosovo is fluid. Relationships between various public bodies have either not been established or are constantly shifting.

One illustration is the reduced coverage provided by the public broadcaster, RTK, at this pivotal moment in Kosovo's history.

RTK is owed Û1.6 million by Kosovo's public electricity company, KEK, which collects licence fees on behalf of RTK but has been unable to pass them on because of its own difficult financial situation. As a result, the salaries of RTK staff are being paid irregularly.

The fee of Û3.50 which every household is required to pay for public television and radio is tacked on to the monthly electricity bill.

Nezir Sinani, a spokesperson for KEK, says that KEK was unhappy with the arrangement. "KEK customer transactions are irregular and incomplete," he says, "whereas KEK has to pay RTK for each transaction made by customers notwithstanding if that transaction is complete or regular."

The collection agreement between the two bodies will end in May and KEK plans to pay RTK before that. But no solution has been found yet for the collection of the licence fee once the current arrangement ends.

Boris Bergant, a vice-president of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and one of RTK's three international board members, says that the association of European public broadcasters regretted the difficulties at RTK at this critical time and that effective mechanisms had to be found to ensure a reliable revenue stream for RTK.

Television is the main and often only source of information for most of Kosovo's citizens.

A core part of RTK's mandate is the provision of unbiased information in the various languages spoken in Kosovo. Roughly one-quarter of its daily programmes are in minority languages, according to RTK figures.

But its signal cannot be received in the region north of Mitrovica, which is almost exclusively Serb and whose inhabitants therefore watch Serbian TV. Serbs there do not pay electricity bills to KEK.

Independence will not improve RTK's position; neither will the assumption of overall responsibility by the EU. But this is the type of situation for which a coherent strategy of state-building is needed. Otherwise, the Kosovars will never have a state that is truly their own.

Declaring independence does not mean that Kosovo will become a state overnight, writes Toby Vogel.