Failed summit unfortunate, but not disastrous

Date: 18/12/03

It will, however, take a determined effort to restore the Union's solidarity, writes Stanley Crossick

THE Brussels summit does not bode well for an effective and cohesive operation of an enlarged European Union.

Ostensibly, the breakdown was due to the inability to find a compromise between two proposals to govern qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers.

Spain and Poland wanted to retain the "Nice formula", which means a decision can be blocked, in a Union of 25, by 13 member states; or 90 out of 321 votes (with the two countries having a disproportionate 27 votes each against 29 for Germany,); or by states representing 38% of the population.

France and Germany wanted a Council decision simply to be blockable by either 13 member states or 40% of the population. The difference has little objective significance, bearing in mind that the Council rarely votes. Why then such a major disagreement?

Its roots can be found in the Nice Treaty. The enlargement protocol, attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam, required an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to be convened before enlargement "in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the treaties on the composition and functioning of the institutions".

The Nice IGC was minimalist, but EU leaders said the treaty amendments were sufficient to pave the way for enlargement. Nevertheless, a further IGC was convened for 2004. So determined was Jacques Chirac to have a Treaty of Nice, but not to give up French voting parity with Germany, that he forced through a ludicrous voting formula, with the other EU leaders acquiescing.

To universal surprise, a fully representative and democratic European Convention agreed by consensus a comprehensive constitutional treaty, including a simplified Council QMV voting formula (the double majority). Despite this, Spain and Poland deliberately painted themselves into a corner by successive public statements that their position was not negotiable.

Spain has a reputation for stubbornness, normally with a view to being "bought off." Poland's position is harder to fathom: it has exhausted its pool of sympathy within the 15 and sacrificed goodwill; its reasons for doing this are less clear.

Prime Minister Leszek Miller does his country's reputation no good when saying that "Poland is a big and proud nation which is not fighting for its own interest only," or that "the values on which the European dream is founded, solidarity and a common future, are much more important than the actual dossiers". Poland is large, but its GDP is less than half that of the Netherlands.

Miller seems to have learned well, but from the wrong master: the French president, who created the problem in the first place and now lectures the Poles on the need to respect the rules of democracy.

The European Commission failed to speak out clearly as the defender of the European interest, and had little influence on the chain of events.

No decision was taken at the summit as to what happens next. The incoming Irish presidency unsurprisingly expressed no eagerness for an early resumption of the negotiations. It would be prudent to await the Spanish election in March and it would probably help not to complicate the June European Parliament elections by having further negotiations before then, although the constitutional treaty must necessarily be central to the electoral campaigning.

There is no intrinsic urgency. The new treaty was expected to come into force at the beginning of 2006; it still need not be delayed beyond 2006 and many of the key provisions, including the one which sabotaged the summit, would not come into effect until 2009. A 6-12 months' delay does not, therefore, present any serious practical problems.

Real damage has, however, been done to the atmosphere surrounding enlargement. It will take a determined effort to restore the Union's solidarity, which is a sine qua non for further integration. This puts subsequent enlargements at risk. Hence the relevance of whether there will be a Franco-German "pioneer group" leading to a two-speed Europe, including the original six founding members. If so, this would probably begin with justice and home affairs cooperation. Whether or not "structured" defence cooperation will await the new treaty also remains to be seen.

More serious is the negative impact of the disagreement on public perception - following the disagreement over the Stability and Growth Pact. How can EU citizens understand why such an apparently minor issue should cause the serious split? How can their confidence be restored in the Union's ability effectively to face the challenges that are real worries? The public needs to be reassured why the failure to agree is unfortunate but not disastrous.

How can the impasse be broken? We will probably have to await a change of circumstances. In the meantime, France and Germany can spell out their joint vision and reassure member states that they will act within the spirit as well as the letter of their obligations. Other members, meanwhile, should agree to close the IGC agenda and publish a list of outstanding issues and where the countries stand on them. The Convention should reconvene to express its opinion on the Italian presidency paper, presented to, but not debated at, the summit.

Progressing the new defence structures, the European arms agency and reinforced defence cooperation should be priorities, and France should signal its determinedness to pave the way to further European integration by offering, as a first step, to share its permanent UN Security Council seat with Germany.

Sadly, at the very time when Europe needs strong leadership, such leadership is influenced by short-term domestic policies.

• Stanley Crossick is director of the European Policy Centre, Brussels. www.theepc.be

Analysis of the failure of the European Council in Brussels, 12-13 December 2003 at which Member States failed to agree a new European Union Constitution. Author is director of the European Policy Centre, Brussels.

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