Explaining the absence of inertia in European Union legislative decision-making

Abstract:

Starting from the observation that supermajorities are needed to pass legislation in the European Union (EU), this article tries to answer the question why this organization passes as many new laws as it does. A possible pattern of explanation is mapped out which focuses on dissimilarity between actor preferences in relation to the legislative status quo. Using power index analysis and computer simulation, the potential for passing new legislation under the different procedural arrangements is first evaluated. Principal component analyses is then used to focus on likely coalition patterns of the actors who are involved in the EU legislative process and to locate the positions of these actors in relation to the position of the current state of affairs. The findings show that the absence of legislative inertia in the European Union can be explained, firstly, by the relative distance between a majority of EU policy-makers to the legislative status quo; and, secondly, by the dimensionality of the underlying issue space.