Expansion: ‘a benefit for the Alliance, and a benefit for Euro-Atlantic security’

Date: 21/11/02

In a Q&A with Dennis Abbott Secretary-General Lord Robertson explains why NATO enlargement matters - and what impact it could have on relations with the EU

What synergies, if any, do you see between EU and NATO enlargement?

NATO and EU enlargement together will consolidate Europe as a common space of security and prosperity from the Baltics to the Balkans. The increasing overlap of membership will further increase the coherence in both organisations' policies. This will benefit Euro-Atlantic stability across the board.

What do you say to those, especially in the US, who are not sure that NATO enlargement is a good thing? Do you regard expansion of the Alliance as your most important achievement in office?

I don't regard enlargement as my own achievement, but an achievement by both current and future members of the Alliance. NATO enlargement promotes often-difficult democratic and military reform in aspirant countries; it locks in that reform when they become members; and it broadens the community of democracies defending and building security through the Alliance. All in all, a net benefit for the Alliance, and for Euro-Atlantic security more broadly. That is my message to any sceptics.

The Prague Summit is expected to develop US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's proposal for a NATO Response Force. Elmar Brok, chairman of the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, believes it will compete with the EU's own rapid reaction force. They do sound confusingly alike - isn't there a real risk here of duplication and wasted resources?

NATO already has a range of rapidly available forces, as we have demonstrated in a succession of Balkan operations. No new forces are involved in the NATO Response Force. Instead, we are reorganising our existing and planned capabilities to be able to undertake short-notice deployments more effectively. Moreover, the emphasis will be on a capacity for high intensity war-fighting, not the Petersberg [chiefly humanitarian] tasks. The bottom line is that NATO's Response Force and the EU's Rapid Reaction Force should be - and will be - complementary. There is no competition.

Are you in favour of the new EU force having access to NATO assets?

Of course I am. The possibility of using NATO assets will give the EU access to essential capabilities for effective crisis management which it otherwise would lack. It enables the EU to draw on NATO's planning system - the most experienced multinational planning system worldwide. It keeps both institutions close together, because it makes them think about problems and their solutions together. And it avoids wasteful duplication in times of scarce budgets.

Do you think the EU has sold itself short by restricting its rapid reaction force to Petersberg tasks?

Robert C. Bell, one of your key US deputies, has described Petersberg tasks as 'far more modest (and less expensive)' than high-intensity, long-range coalition expeditionary operations [European Voice, 23 May 2002].

Is there not a danger that the US may underestimate the importance (and cost) of the role Europe can play in winning the peace?

European contributions in peacekeeping are vitally important for our security, and they are certainly not free of risk nor free of cost. However, peacekeeping and similar tasks must not be an alibi for not acquiring capabilities for other, more demanding contingencies.

We need forces which are geared to the full spectrum of threats.

For the Europeans not to have such forces would, in effect, lead to a division of labour that would clearly go against our strategic interests: the US does the fighting, Europe does the peacekeeping afterwards.

Both sides of the Atlantic must avoid such an outcome - the Europeans by acquiring new capabilities, the US by accepting peacekeeping as a key mission in our new security environment.

You recently described Europe as a 'flabby giant with no muscles' when comparing its military capability to that of the US. With a few exceptions, most European countries remain unwilling to spend more heavily on military assets. What are you doing to change their mind?

First, I am telling them that they have only one choice: modernisation or marginalisation. That basic message has been understood. Second, I tell them to focus on improving certain key capabilities, and to coordinate their steps. Third, they must reprioritise. They must buy the kind of capabilities they need to face the challenges of today, not yesterday. Fourth, be imaginative. If you can't buy, lease. If something is too expensive for you alone, team up with others and buy cheaper by buying in bulk. And, finally, yes, Europeans also have to rethink their overall spending levels. Several European allies have already done so.

How much of a problem are US restrictions on 'technology transfer' to improving allied defence cooperation?

It is true that US restrictions on technology transfer have gone some way, historically, in impeding full transatlantic defence industrial cooperation.

That is why I am so pleased that the US government is looking at innovative new ways to ease these restrictions for its allies, as well as putting in place more modern licensing agreements. It is important, however, not to use the 'tech-transfer' issue as a scapegoat or a smokescreen for European deficiencies. Major improvements to Europe's capabilities could be made up simply through more, and better, European spending on defence. And that spending can be on European-made products.

How important is the role NATO can play in the war against terror? What is the right mix of military and political instruments in ensuring international security? Are NATO's command structures flexible enough to be prepared for the unexpected?

NATO is not going to mutate into the world's terrorist hunter. The challenge is too complex for any single organisation. That said, the Alliance must make its contribution to the struggle against terrorism.

We must be able to deter, disrupt and if necessary defend against future attacks. The Prague summit will give us the tools to do this: a new military concept for the defence against terrorism, a new NATO Response Force, a radically streamlined command structure, and a commitment at the highest level to acquire new military capabilities will go a long way to make NATO fit to face this challenge. NATO is becoming a focal point for coordinating and planning the multinational military contribution to our defence against terrorism and other asymmetric threats.

Interview with NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson.