Author (Person) | Hou, Liyang |
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Publisher | Taylor & Francis |
Series Title | European Competition Journal |
Series Details | Volume 7, Number 1, Pages 47-70 |
Publication Date | January 2011 |
ISSN | 1744-1056 |
Content Type | Journal Article |
Introduction: "An excessive price is a price set by a dominant undertaking excessively above the competitive level in order to exploit its customers. This purpose of exploitation makes an excessive price essentially different from a disguised refusal to supply or a variant of price squeezes. A disguised refusal to supply may take the form of an unacceptably high price with the intention to deny the request of supply. A price squeeze may be committed by imposing a high price on an upstream market while maintaining or decreasing the price at the related downstream level. However, both a refusal to deal and a price squeeze are aimed at excluding competitors, rather than exploiting consumers. While the devastating effect of excessive prices on consumer welfare is notorious, the prohibition of excessive prices falls into the most controversial subjects both in economics and law in the EU."
"This article aims to shed some light on the relevant practices in EU competition law. In the following, the second part briefly introduces two dramatically opposed views in economics on the viability of excessive prices. Due to the controversy many scholars have submitted that excessive prices can only take place in exceptional circumstances. Thus, the third part first evaluates several exceptional circumstances proposed by scholars, and then brings forward itsown proposal. The subsequent part examines the analytical framework established by case law. Some conclusions are presented in the last part."
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Source Link | Link to Main Source https://doi.org/10.5235/174410511795887606 |
Subject Categories | Internal Markets |
Subject Tags | Competition Law | Policy, Prices |