Evaluation of the Risks of Collective Dominance in the Audit Industry in France

"This study proposes an evaluation of the risks of collective dominance in the statutory audit market in France following the criteria that resulted from the Airtours case. In particular, it analyses how regulatory obligations governing statutory auditors may favour the emergence of tacit collusion among auditors. We obviously do not disregard the fact that twice in recent years the French Ministry of the Economy, then the Conseil d’Etat, has approved mergers in this sector, thereby discounting any risk of collective dominance.

However, it seems that the impact of the successive mergers in this market on the risk of collective dominance shhould call for an in-depth examination. Measuring this impact is not straightforward—first, because the market itself is hard to define and because the legal framework for audit missions, which we describe below, has changed significantly in the past few years."