European Union agencies and their management boards: an assessment of accountability and demoi-cratic legitimacy

Abstract:

Inspired by the notion of demoi-cracy, this contribution analyses the legitimacy of European Union agencies (EUAs). It asks how far member states' representation on the management boards (MBs) of EUAs constitutes an instance of vertical accountability and a possible source of demoi-cratic legitimacy. In accordance with the horizontal dimension of demoi-cracy, the contribution additionally investigates the transnational links between MB representatives and their peers from other member states as possible instances of peer accountability. Drawing on document analysis and an original survey with MB representatives from six EUAs, the empirical results reveal a rather ambivalent picture of MBs' political accountability. Only the MB of the European Railway Agency (ERA) meets the established demoi-cratic criteria in the sense of vertical accountability. All other EUA MBs investigated possess either weak de jure or de facto political accountability (or both). Peer accountability, in contrast, is more pronounced for most EUAs, but is still predominantly nationally rather than transnationally oriented. This implies that, from a demoi-cratic perspective, there is considerable potential to improve MBs' de jure and de facto political and peer accountability.

This article is part of a Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy.