European diplomacy over Iraq: United in theory, divided in practice

Date: 22/02/03

The European Union's new-found “unity” over Iraq may not last long

WHEN the leaders of the 15 members of the European Union assembled in Brussels on February 17th for a special summit about Iraq, there was a strong feeling that the anti-war party was in the ascendant. The weekend before the summit there had been huge demonstrations for peace across western Europe. Some of the biggest turn-outs had been in the capitals of Britain, Spain and Italy, whose leaders have backed the American line on Iraq. And the ripple of applause that greeted Dominique de Villepin, the French foreign minister, when he made his plea for weapons inspections rather than war at the United Nations also was still ringing in the ears of European leaders.

So Tony Blair, José María Aznar and Silvio Berlusconi found themselves out in the cold, did they? No. The joint declaration at the end of the summit was surprisingly tough. It stated that “Iraq has a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully” and endorsed the idea of the use of force as a last resort. The crucial question of timing, however, was left hanging in the air. In a sop to the Franco-German position, the EU insisted on giving the United Nations weapons inspectors “the time and resources the UN Security Council believes that they need.” Then, in a nod to the Spanish-British position, the statement added that “inspections cannot continue indefinitely”. Both sides could claim some satisfaction. But like all such diplomatic compromises, this one is liable to prove fragile under the pressure of events.

Diplomats who followed the private discussions of the European leaders described the atmosphere among them as “tense and frosty”. No sooner had the dinner finished than these tensions emerged. France's Jacques Chirac gave a press conference in which he lambasted sundry central European countries for taking a pro-American line. The next day, Mr Blair riposted with a letter to the leaders of the ten countries, mainly in central Europe, that are due to join the Union in 2004, regretting that an initial invitation to them to attend this EU summit had been withdrawn. The implied slap at France was duly noted in Paris, with the French press accusing Mr Blair of once again breaking ranks with an agreed EU position.

In two camps

The fact is that the EU remains split down the middle. Lined up with the Americans on Iraq are Britain, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands and Ireland; in the be-more-patient camp are Germany, France, Belgium, Greece, Finland, Sweden and Austria, while Luxembourg, the EU's smallest state, seems paralysed by indecision. Both sides know the realities of world power and the limits of their own. Both have outside resources to call on: the patient governments know that the voters of Europe are strongly on their side; the Atlanticists know that most of the would-be member governments, well aware how they escaped the Soviet grip, are in their camp.

The EU is not the only Brussels-based institution that has split over Iraq. NATO has only just emerged from a bitter three-week argument about how far to go in giving Turkey the defence against Iraq that it had asked for. France, Germany and Belgium last week refused to agree to a package of defensive measures for Turkey that was backed by the other 16 NATO members. Such a package, they argued, would imply that war was inevitable.

In the end, a deal was struck by taking the necessary decisions in NATO's defence planning committee, of which France, by its own long-past choice, is not a member. After intense diplomatic pressure, the Germans and Belgians caved in. But several of the elements of the package of agreements had to be removed to appease them. Ironically, just as a deal was agreed at NATO, it became clear that Turkey was in no undue hurry to allow the United States to use its territory for an invasion of Iraq anyway. In the end, that will probably happen. Meanwhile, as George Robertson, the secretary-general of NATO, acknowledges, the dispute over Turkey has done real damage to the organisation.

The difficulty is that current arguments within Europe are not really about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. They are about attitudes to the United States and to its pre-eminence. Such differences of opinion are always likely to re-emerge, at some point.