Europe and Iran. The nuclear route

What prospects for a deal?

EVERY diplomatic road has its twists. Whether towards success or failure can be hard to tell at the time. A tentative deal struck this week marks such a new turn in efforts by Britain, France and Germany to head off Iran's presumed nuclear-weapons ambitions and to rescue the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from oblivion.

Assuming it sticks, the agreement could avert an imminent rumpus. Despite months of American pressure, Iran's nefarious nuclear activities would be unlikely to be referred to the UN Security Council when the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear guardian, meets later this month. Yet if that is all it achieved, this week's deal would be a failure. Only concerted pressure brought Iran to the negotiating table. Unless that pressure is now kept up, by Europe and America, but also by Russia, Japan, China and others, there is no chance of levering Iran out of the bomb-seeking business.

All the deal does initially is suspend Iran's most dangerous nuclear activities - a point the European trio thought they had reached a year ago. They insisted then too that Iran halt work towards enriching uranium and producing plutonium. Iran claims such activities are merely to prepare fuel for future civilian nuclear reactors. But its 20 years of lies to IAEA inspectors have led most other governments, including the European three, to conclude that it secretly wants to use such materials as the fissile core of a bomb. Settling details of a comprehensive suspension now would lead on to a second element of the deal: a package of inducements that could lead to increased trade, enhanced political dialogue, even direct civilian nuclear assistance in energy and medical research. All this, the Europeans hope, will encourage Iran to give up its most troubling nuclear technologies for good.

The hope could yet prove futile. The deal on offer presupposes that Iran will negotiate in good faith. But then why has it built extensive, and expensive, enrichment facilities when it has only one power reactor, not yet operating, that will be supplied with Russian fuel, ask the sceptics? And although inspectors have not caught Iran busily at work on a bomb, they have caught it covering up nuclear experiments that amount to everything but.

For its part, Iran proclaims loudly that it has a “sovereign right” under the NPT to enrich uranium and make plutonium; any suspension agreed with the Europeans, it insists, will be only temporary. Yet whatever rights the treaty confers on those who sign it come only from meeting the overriding obligation not to pursue nuclear weapons. It is after all a non-proliferation treaty, not a nuclear-power generation treaty, and should not be allowed to become a bomb-cheats' charter. Iran's egregious violations of nuclear safeguards are already evidence enough of its failures in that regard. Indeed, this issue should be a deal-breaker. Given its record, unless Iran gives up the technologies that will soon bring it to the point of nuclear break-out from the NPT, it will remain a danger to all.

And if, against current odds, Iran decides to trade? Then America should be prepared to join in too. So far it has held aloof. After all, Iran refuses to recognise Israel's right even to exist and supports some terrorist groups. Yet the makings of a nuclear deal could unlock the possibility of other deals too. Success is very far from certain, but if there is to be an insurmountable obstacle along the way, let it be Iran alone.

Editorial asks 'What prospects for a deal?'