Equal partners need a common destiny

Date: 20/02/1997

By Robert E Hunter

The US ambassador to NATO highlights the crucial decisions now facing the alliance and explains their implications for the EU.

RELATIONS between NATO and the European Union are changing profoundly, out of necessity.

Today, as both institutions work to build Europe's future, they must break down old barriers of attitude and practice. Indeed, as they become more deeply involved in central Europe and beyond, they must complement one another and work to the same ends.

Central European countries may have preferences in terms of which institution they would like to join first, but they look at relations with the West in a more integrated way than we do with our separate institutional views.

That does not imply that there must be a direct linkage between NATO and EU enlargement. A few governments favour that course, but it has clearly been rejected as Union policy. Nevertheless, some parallelism of approach is a fact of life and some coordination will be valuable for all concerned.

This year, NATO will take its most profound strategic decisions since it admitted Germany to membership in 1955. As the alliance creates permanent, institutional ties with countries in the heartland of Europe - and, we hope, deeper relationships with Russia and Ukraine - the strategic picture in Europe will change radically.

The EU will, of necessity, be affected and its enlargement, in turn, will affect NATO. The task is to ensure the two developments reinforce rather than work against one another. The two institutions are pursuing basically similar goals: to bring the countries of central Europe fully into their rightful places in the West.

For its part, NATO is not just devoted to collective defence. By creating links to military establishments in central Europe, it is helping societies inculcate those democratic principles and values on which all of our countries in the West are based.

One phrase characterises NATO's effort, and also applies to the Union: we have a rare second chance to complete the Marshall Plan of half a century ago.

At the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, the alliance decided to take in new members. It has reaffirmed this political commitment every six months since then, and has moved steadily and transparently towards admitting those members.

A key milestone was the 1995 NATO enlargement study. One purpose was to show allies what must be done to ensure that a larger alliance will be just as strong and effective as it is now.

Unlike the Union, NATO cannot afford to distinguish between the concepts of 'widening' and 'deepening' because, as a security alliance, if widening meant a risk to the alliance's basic cohesion and capacity, there would be no point in taking in new members. Indeed, NATO's appeal to central European countries would be greatly lessened.

The NATO study also told aspirant countries what their rights and responsibilities would be as allies. Each must accept the full corpus (the acquis) of NATO membership, with no special arrangements. That does not mean the alliance will deploy troops or create infrastructure which is not needed at a time when there is no threat to security. Such decisions will be taken in light of circumstances at any time.

But all allies - new and old - must accept the same responsibilities and commitments.

During the past year, NATO has intensified its dialogue with countries which have expressed an interest in joining; and at the ministerial meeting last December, it decided that a summit in Madrid in July 1997 would invite the first countries in central Europe to do so.

Each will then negotiate membership with NATO, a process far shorter than negotiating to join the EU. Most important, this will be the time when candidates fully recognise that NATO membership is not just about receiving security, but also about helping to provide it for all the other allies.

This is one reason why NATO is being cautious about the process of taking in new members.

Unlike the Union, it cannot name a large group of countries which will definitely join at some point provided they meet set criteria. Indeed, a country's true moment of accession to NATO is not when it finally signs the Washington Treaty, but when the allies first invite it to join - the moment when they declare their willingness to make a strategic commitment. There can be no room for mistakes or for turning back.

Of course, NATO enlargement is only part of a broader effort to build lasting security in Europe. This includes the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); it includes the EU - indeed, the Union's engagement in central Europe is a profoundly strategic act, an act of security; and it includes the Western European Union (WEU).

The Madrid summit will encompass NATO's internal adaptation, its outreach and new missions, such as the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.

These efforts must form a holistic approach. Each element must reinforce the others and also relate effectively to what the EU is doing with many of the same countries - not linkage, but mutual understanding.

Three other NATO endeavours stand out. The first is to strengthen the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the alliance's most important development for many years.

PFP enables partner countries, through self-selection, to engage in a wide variety of NATO activities on a practical, day-to-day basis. It helps them undergo internal conversion, beginning with their defence establishments, both for its own sake and to enlighten and fertilise efforts in other parts of society.

This spring, NATO will inaugurate an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC), drawing together the PFP and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This will give members greater political capacity to guide their own development within the partnership.

At the same time, NATO is committed to holding open the door to membership, to assure countries which want to join that the first nations selected will not be the last.

The US position is very clear: the door to membership will remain open as long as there are European countries ready and willing to bear the responsibilities it entails. At the summit, the allies must demonstrate to countries which are not selected first time round that they have not been thrust away.

Secondly, NATO is trying to develop a relationship with Russia and, in parallel, with Ukraine.

Trying to craft a long-range strategic relationship with Russia reflects the fact that it has a legitimate, important and critical role to play in European security. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe will be modernised; NATO has proposed creating a formal, consultative relationship with Moscow, perhaps through a NATO-Russia charter; and the alliance has taken some unilateral steps, such as declaring it has “no plan, no reason and no intention” to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states.

Thirdly, NATO is changing the way it is organised internally, in order to deal with the challenges of the future rather than those of the Cold War.

It is making its military command structure more effective and efficient, based on all 16 states, with Spain taking its full place in the alliance and the prospect that France will do the same.

These changes are also making possible the full establishment within NATO of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Three years ago, the US declared its support for greater European responsibility and visibility within the alliance, as well as for a functioning ESDI.

Then, in December 1995, France declared it would henceforth seek to build the ESDI within NATO, not outside it; to reinforce the alliance rather than compete with it; and to support the transatlantic link rather than question it.

On the basis of these two landmark decisions, NATO and the WEU are working to make the ESDI a reality. Because of NATO's efforts, the WEU will for the first time gain a true capacity to act, using alliance assets including officers and headquarters.

But whether that will actually happen remains problematic, for a simple reason. The US considers itself to be a European power and is ready to take part in any significant challenge to security on the continent. If this were the case, NATO would go into action and not the WEU.

Finally, NATO's efforts are designed to reinforce - and be enriched by - what the Union is doing. EU enlargement is not compensation for anyone, but still needs to be complementary with NATO enlargement. Indeed, all the efforts of the two institutions must bolster one another. Only in that way can either fulfil its responsibilities.

They have a common task and a common destiny, and all must work together to see that it is realised.

Robert E Hunter is the US permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council.