Enlargement – Thinking bigger

Along with most western Europeans in the early 1990s, I thought that enlarging the European Union eastwards would happen at some time, that it would take a while and that before anything else happened we would have to await political and economic stabilisation in the countries undergoing change.

My task at the time in German politics, however, meant that I had to travel extensively in the countries of the former Soviet bloc and the former Yugoslavia. Experiencing the reality of the young democracies in eastern and central Europe at first-hand offered me new insights. I realised that only a credible European perspective could guarantee the long-term success of the changes. It was not possible to heap the burden of extensive reform onto the shoulders of the people who were looking towards Europe with such hope and expectations while at the same time leaving them in doubt about becoming members of the EU.

When, in July 1999, Romano Prodi invited me to assume responsibility for enlargement, I was surprised. I had not been expecting that the new president of the Commission would make enlargement a real priority. I also realised that it was a risk for him to place responsibility for enlargement in the hands of a German.

I know of course that national considerations play no part in the distribution of portfolios within the Commission. But a leopard cannot change its spots and a German enlargement commissioner would in any event highlight more effectively the historic and moral aspect of enlargement better than anyone else. I said as much to Prodi but he saw no problem because he understood, as I did, that the people of central and eastern Europe had a clear moral claim to membership. They had been the victims of Fascism and then of Stalinism. They had borne the brunt of the outcome of the Second World War. Nor had they been asked whether they wanted to live behind an Iron Curtain. Now, however, they wanted to seize the opportunity to secure their future once and for all within a unified Europe. They had no wish to remain stuck in a political no-man’s land.

In hindsight it quickly becomes clear what the principal milestones were. First, there was the Helsinki summit in December 1999 at which truly historic decisions were adopted. From that point onwards we were negotiating with 12 candidates at the same time and were preparing Turkey for the commencement of negotiations, preparations that involved a stringent pre-accession procedure. The Helsinki decisions were possible because in 1999 Europe was giving pride of place to the political and strategic aspect of enlargement and the prospect of peace that it offered. 1999 saw the Kosovo war and it became abundantly clear that European integration was primarily the most important component of any durable European framework for peace.

As early as 2000 the shape of the real accession scenario was visible. In view of the progress with negotiations, I deemed it possible that ten countries could at the same time be brought to the finishing line (all apart from Romania and Bulgaria) and that accession could be organised in such a way that the new members could take part in the European elections in 2004. For a long time, this was highly controversial. Most of the member states preferred accession to involve a small group of ‘unproblematic’ countries, which clearly meant that the initial round of accessions should not involve Poland. I remained utterly convinced that this was politically a bad move and that it could not be required of Poland. Poland thus became for me the key country and it took up most of my time. The strategy had prospects only if Poland could manage to meet the accession conditions as fully as all the other countries. I was able to convince the then Polish prime minister, Jerzy Buzek, that this was also the right path for Poland. Any accession based on easier conditions would hardly have been possible and if it had been then it would have been stigmatised forever. I am very proud of the fact that this political approach bore fruit and that Poland today is deriving great benefit from it.

The Nice summit in December 2000 created, in formal terms, the institutional requirements for enlargement and also a roadmap for the negotiations, which would make it possible to conclude the talks by the end of 2002. At the Laeken summit in December 2001 we were able to name the ten countries with which negotiations would be completed by the end of 2002. And one year later in Copenhagen this proved to be the case.

In retrospect I find it miraculous that the roadmap succeeded. I remember one meeting with my staff early in 2002 at which I listed the problems remaining unsolved: the Treaty of Nice had been rejected in Ireland; there had still been no mention of funding or agriculture; the matter of Cyprus was unresolved; the Kaliningrad problem was proving difficult and the accession of the Czech Republic was being called into question by powerful circles in Germany. The list could have gone on.

But we managed it. Why? The EU had recognised enlargement as a historic need and all three institutions pulled together in order to complete the task. The Commission deployed all its resources and on this occasion it showed what it is capable of, both in political and technical terms. Of decisive importance was, however, that the governments, the parliaments, the people in the candidate countries trusted EU policy and agreed to shoulder the burden that was required of them in order to prepare for accession.

Three years down the road and Bulgaria and Romania are now members. The vision of Helsinki in 1999 has become a reality. Enlargement has made Europe politically, economically and culturally much stronger. The anxieties linked to enlargement have proved groundless both in the old as well as in the new member states. I believe that we can learn from this for the future. We must not allow ourselves to be led by anxiety and short-term, here-today-gone-tomorrow interests but we should keep a cool head in determining our strategic interests and then have the courage to do what is necessary and what is right.

• Günter Verheugen is vice-president of the European Commission in charge of enterprise and industry. In 1999-2004 he was commissioner for enlargement and in 1998-99 he was secretary of state in Germany’s foreign ministry.

Along with most western Europeans in the early 1990s, I thought that enlarging the European Union eastwards would happen at some time, that it would take a while and that before anything else happened we would have to await political and economic stabilisation in the countries undergoing change.