Author (Person) | Brücker, Herbert |
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Series Title | Journal of European Integration |
Series Details | Vol.26, No.1, March 2004, p3-23 |
Publication Date | March 2004 |
Content Type | Journal | Series | Blog |
Article abstract: This paper discusses the eastward enlargement process of the EU in the framework of a simple 'war of attrition' bargaining game. Both players - the existing EU members and the applicants - benefit from enlargement, yet for the applicants, reform to the acquis is costly, while the EU prefers substantially reformed candidates. A waiting game unfolds. Within this framework the present enlargement round is analysed and policy results are deduced. For example, it is shown that delegating the evaluation of applicants to a third party, compensating applicants for their reform efforts or increasing the benefits for new members are all effective negotiation strategies for the EU that have been applied in the process. |
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Source Link | Link to Main Source http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/ |
Subject Categories | Politics and International Relations |
Countries / Regions | Eastern Europe |