Author (Person) | Fernández-Albertos, José |
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Series Title | West European Politics |
Series Details | Vol.29, No.1, January 2006, p28-46 |
Publication Date | January 2006 |
ISSN | 0140-2382 |
Content Type | Journal | Series | Blog |
Abstract: In economic voting models, the electorate punishes governments associated with bad economic results and rewards those who provide prosperity. However, citizens do not always place the same weight on economic considerations when deciding their vote. This weight, it is argued, is a function of the degree to which governments can be deemed responsible for domestic economic outcomes. More precisely, the article hypothesises that when the economy is highly vulnerable to external economic conditions (and thus less controllable by the national government), voters will value less the information they receive on the state of the economy, and, as a consequence, electoral behaviour will be less influenced by economic performance. This conjecture is tested empirically using survey data from 15 European countries. Consistently with the prediction, it is found that employment expectations matter more the greater the degree of economic closeness of the country. General economic expectations have an impact on voting regardless of the level of economic openness, and no sign of pocketbook voting is detected. Also, the evidence seems to suggest that the internationalisation of the economy plays an exonerating role only under left-wing governments. |
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Source Link | Link to Main Source http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/ |
Subject Categories | Politics and International Relations |
Countries / Regions | Europe |