Divide and rule

Date: 04/09/1997

A NEW dimension will be added to the European Union if the voters of Scotland give the thumbs up next week to the UK government's plans to establish a Scottish parliament.

Support for the constitutional initiative would see the formalisation of direct links between Scotland and EU institutions with the creation of a distinctive Scottish government, scrutiny of Euro-legislation by a Scottish parliament and the establishment of a Scottish permanent representation in Brussels, as a complement - not a rival - to the UK's existing embassy to the Union.

Scottish input into EU business has grown steadily since Strathclyde became the first of the country's regional authorities to establish an office in the Belgian capital almost two decades ago.

Since then, the range of geographical and sectoral interests with a foot in the Union door, many of them closely linked with the umbrella organisation Scotland Europa, has grown at a steady rate.

The constitutional changes which the UK government is asking the Scottish electorate to support in next Thursday's (11 September) referendum - followed by a second referendum a week later on a blueprint for a Welsh assembly - reinforce this trend, placing it on a firmer legal and political footing.

Few doubt that the Scottish electorate will endorse the government's plans for a Scottish parliament with substantial powers, ending the anomaly whereby Scotland is the only democratic country with its own legal system but no legislature of its own.

By accident rather than design, the date coincides with the 700th anniversary of one of Scotland's more memorable military victories: the defeat of the English army by Scottish freedom fighter William Wallace in 1297 at the Battle of Stirling Bridge - an episode in the country's history which provided the theme for the block-buster film Braveheart.

The move to restore a separate Scottish parliament 290 years after its predecessor was abolished by the Act of Union between England and Scotland is supported by the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party and the Liberal Democrats.

Opposition to the move is being led by Conservatives, who are in the embarrassing situation of having no national or European elected representatives in Scotland bar a handful of local councillors, and by strands in the business community.

Opponents are focusing their attack on the government's plan to give the parliament, with its 129 members elected by proportional representation, limited tax-raising powers. Critics warn that the proposal to give the assembly the right to alter the rate of income tax set by the UK parliament would lead to higher taxation and to an exodus of business and financial interests - even though this fiscal power would be limited by law to a maximum of 3p (0.0375 ecu) either way.

That fear is coupled with allegations of corruption and skulduggery in certain Labour Party circles in Scotland, allowing opponents to raise doubts about the style of a future Scottish government, which would inevitably be Labour dominated.

Despite the obstacles, observers expect voters to give the double 'yes' the government is seeking in next week's referendum, first to the creation of a parliament and, secondly, to endowing it with tax-raising powers.

This would open the door for the transfer of responsibility from the UK to the Scottish parliament of a whole range of day-to-day issues: health, education and training, local government, transport, environment, economic development, law and home affairs, agriculture and fisheries, sport and research.

The UK government would retain responsibility for the country's links with the Union, but those links would inevitably have to be adapted to take account of the changed constitutional circumstances.

How this will work out in practice is still unclear, and whatever arrangements are put in place may well have to be fine-tuned when the parliament starts operating in 2000. But architects of the new edifice are currently examining models already being applied elsewhere in the Union.

Given its federal structure, it was hardly surprising that Germany took the lead in ensuring a degree of regional representation in Union decision-making.

It achieved this through the establishment of an EU observer who would attend Council of Ministers' meetings and report back to the country's Länder on the negotiations and decisions. “Basically, this was just a passive role, attending meetings, not speaking and writing up minutes. Things have certainly changed since those days,” explained one German official.

Largely as the price to be paid for ensuring Länder approval for the European Single Act with its extension of majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the federal government agreed to give the regional authorities a more active input - an arrangement updated and enshrined in a March 1993 law.

Länder officials now participate alongside federal civil servants in Council of Ministers working groups on draft legislation and Länder ministers are part of the formal German delegation at Council meetings. When the proposed EU measures under discussion are the responsibility of the regional authorities - as with legislation on 'television without frontiers' or voting rights in local elections for Union citizens - then Länder representatives take the lead in presenting Germany's case and voting on behalf of the government.

Similar arrangements for allocating responsibility between the federal government and the Länder in the Council of Ministers also apply in Austria. In addition, two officials are seconded to the country's EU permanent representation to try to ensure the relationship between the two tiers of government over Union issues is as smooth as possible.

But the prize for constructing the most elaborate structure for sub-national representation in the Council of Ministers goes, without any doubt, to Belgium.

As the country has moved from a unitary to a federal state, it has been forced to devise a system which takes careful account of different regional and linguistic sensitivities.

The first stage involved a change in the EU's founding Treaty of Rome itself, adding the words “at ministerial level” to Article 146's provision that “the Council shall consist of a representative of each member state”.

“We needed to do this so that regional ministers could represent the country. When we insisted on the change in the Maastricht negotiations some member states such as France and Spain were initially opposed, but now it is widely accepted,” said one senior Belgian official.

Like Germany, Belgium entrusts leadership of its Council delegation to a regional representative when areas of overwhelming regional responsibility - industry, research, culture, education, tourism and regional planning - are on the agenda.

But with three separate regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) and two linguistic communities (one for francophones and the other for German speakers) with responsibilities for education and cultural issues, the division of responsibilities is even more complex.

A comprehensive agreement concluded in 1994 sets out in detail how the system should operate, stipulating how different layers of government should coordinate policy before each meeting and even indicating how Belgium should be represented at informal ministerial gatherings.

In addition, a comprehensive matrix negotiated by all those concerned lays down how the leadership of the Belgian delegation at official and ministerial level will rotate among the five sub-national bodies on each of 14 individual policy areas outside exclusive federal responsibility between now and the end of 1999.

Despite the sophisticated nature of the system, further refinements are sporadically proposed. Last year, the Flemish parliament suggested it should be possible to split up the votes that Belgium wields in the Council so that in the event of a policy dispute between the regions, each could vote as it saw fit.

To outsiders, the whole structure appears overly bureaucratic and cumbersome. But those on the inside retort that it is essential and beneficial to both Belgium and the Union.

“The system is rather elaborate and technical, but it works. If we did not transfer power to the regions as well as to the Union, then we would be facing a democratic deficit and that would stoke up bad feeling towards the EU within the regions,” explained one senior Belgian official.