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Abstract
In the following contribution I propose an analytical approach in which dealing with differences in decision-making is the central factor in explaining the output of European governance. It is the hypothesis that differences can, under certain conditions, be a positive potential for effective governance and problem-solving in the European Union. The prerequisite conditions include actors that take differences seriously, structures of decision-making that are suitable for recognising and organising differences and processes of decision-making in which actors deal with differences in a democratic and communicative way. The analytical approach is applied to European constitution making and the European Convention. First, it is analysed how representative the membership of the Convention has been. It can be assumed that Members of the Convention in order to recognise differences and have an interest in the positive potential of difference must represent differences themselves. Second, it is examined how difference in institutional concepts with regard to a greater involvement of national parliaments in European politics was dealt with. Did arguing influence the protocol on national parliaments in the Convention's draft or have status and power been more important for the solution that was finally agreed upon? Third, it is investigated how difference in interests between big and small states with regard to the position of the President of the European Council influenced the final decision. Although difference was dealt with less democratically and communicatively than in the case of national parliaments the arguments of Members of the Convention against a permanent President were not without consequences for the final article in the Convention's draft. Having shown in the empirical part that differences can be a positive potential for European constitution making, I conclude with the normative proposition that the democratic organisation of difference is the task of a European Constitutional Treaty.
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