Denmark’s daily dilemma at the IGC

Date: 25/07/1996

ANY foreigner who visited Copenhagen in the run-up to the second referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in

1993 and is following the current Danish debate on the future of Europe would have a hard time believing it was the same country.

Those who campaigned for a second No to Maastricht in May 1993 all used the same argument: the four reserves on the future development of the Union which Copenhagen wrung from its EU partners in the Edinburgh Agreement were not worth the paper they were written on.

Yet today, those very same Eurosceptics argue the exact opposite, insisting that it is essential for the 'opt-outs' agreed at the December 1992 summit in Edinburgh to be preserved intact during the current round of Intergovernmental Conference negotiations.

There are many reasons for this U-turn.

It can be explained in part by domestic political considerations, but it also has much to do with the fact that clear signs are now emerging that the Edinburgh Agreement is, in fact, having a significant impact on the way Copenhagen can - and, more importantly, cannot - act in cooperation with its European partners.

The agreement which allowed the Danish government to put Maastricht to the vote for a second time while defending itself against charges that it was holding another referendum simply because it did not like the result of the first, gave the Danes four key reserves on possible future changes to the treaty.

The agreement pledges that Denmark: will not participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union without the consent of the Danish people in a referendum;

will not accept any move to replace national citizenship with EU citizenship; cannot participate in the development of a common European defence; and cannot accept any form of 'supranationality' in cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs under the so-called 'third pillar' of the Maastricht Treaty.

Any change to these four reserves can only be made with the consent of the Danish people through another referendum.

However, the agreement also contains a clause which prevents Denmark from blocking IGC negotiations aimed at allowing other member states to make progress in these areas.

Copenhagen is now beginning to feel the practical effect of its reserves.

At the end of June, Copenhagen had to invoke, for the first time, one of its four opt-outs from Union decisions, when telecommunications ministers meeting in Luxembourg approved an 'A-point' on ways to enforce cooperation between the EU and the Western European Union (WEU) in the evacuation of European citizens from danger zones around the globe.

Denmark issued a declaration emphasising that it could not participate in this form of cooperation because of the provisions of the Edinburgh Agreement.

Danish diplomats emphasise the seriousness of their country's decision to go it alone.

Among other things, the decision calls upon representatives from the 15 member states to draw up joint contingency plans to prepare for future evacuations in potentially dangerous areas.

The Danish foreign ministry has not yet issued any formal instructions to its embassies as to how they should respond to any EU invitation to take part in such planning meetings.

But the mood in Copenhagen is clear - Danish diplomats will not be allowed to participate.

Denmark has a long tradition of using other countries to help in the evacuation of its citizens. Just two months ago, two Danes were included in the evacuation exercise mounted by the French military in the Central African Republic. In Rwanda, Danish missionaries were evacuated with the help of the Belgian and French militaries.

Despite its decision not to take part in discussions about the use of WEU assets by the EU, Copenhagen insists its citizens will not be left to fend for themselves when trouble erupts in danger spots around the world.

When pressed on the issue, the government points to the general clause in the treaty which requires that all EU countries help Union citizens in areas where their own country is not represented.

The Danish government is also doing its best not to become isolated in discussions with its EU partners on justice and home affairs issues.

In the current debate about whether the European Court of Justice (ECJ) should have the right to arbitrate between two countries in disputes over the interpretation of conventions adopted under the third pillar, Denmark - unlike the UK - has unhesitatingly supported calls for the ECJ to be given a role.

When challenged on whether this constitutes a breach of the terms of the Edinburgh Agreement, Copenhagen argues that giving the Court a role in the supervision of such conventions does not change the intergovernmental character of cooperation on justice and home affairs.

But while Denmark seeks to play an active and constructive role in cooperation on third pillar issues, its IGC negotiators have a much more difficult task when the discussion turns to possible changes in the nature of member state cooperation in this field.

A majority of EU governments argue that some aspects of the present cooperation, such as visas and immigration, should be transferred to the communitarised first pillar, effectively ending the intergovernmental nature of current work on these issues.

This is unacceptable to Denmark because of the provisions of the agreement.

But since it has promised not to block any changes desired by other member states, the eventual outcome of the deliberations could see Copenhagen 'opting out' of these areas if the rest of the EU decides that they should, in future, be dealt with in a supranational way.

Danish IGC negotiators face the same problem in the current discussions on whether to include the so-called Petersberg tasks of peace enforcement in the next treaty - another step which would be unacceptable to Copenhagen under the terms of the Edinburgh Agreement.

The key to resolving Denmark's problems at the IGC lies with its government.

But with a large number of polls repeatedly confirming that a majority of Danes are opposed to any lifting of one or more of the Edinburgh reserves, the government is not - at least for the time being - showing any sign of having the political will to go to the people to ask for their permission to alter them.

Insiders in Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen's office constantly reiterate that his government is determined to avoid a referendum on the outcome of this IGC.

They acknowledge, however, that some treaty changes currently being considered would automatically trigger a vote because they would involve a further transfer of sovereignty to Brussels.

Under the Danish constitution, even a relatively simple change such as giving the EU the status of a 'judicial person' - allowing it, among other things, to own property in its own right - would force the government to put the revised treaty to a referendum.

As the IGC talks enter a new phase, with member state representatives now being asked to negotiate on concrete proposals for reform instead of simply reiterating well-known positions, the most difficult areas for Copenhagen are the negotiations on the second and third pillars.

On the question of EU citizenship, a large majority of member states have indicated that they would support the addition of a new clause into the treaty stipulating that it would not replace national citizenship. That would solve one Danish problem.

On EMU, the day of reckoning is unlikely to arrive in Denmark for some time, as Copenhagen will probably wait for Swedish accession to the third stage before it even contemplates signing up to the single currency zone - and this is unlikely to happen before 2002 because of the problems facing the Swedish economy.

But when it comes to deliberations on the future of the second and third pillars of Maastricht, Denmark faces an almost daily dilemma in its dealings with its European partners.

Given the lack of political will in Copenhagen to tackle the issue head on, this dilemma is likely to dog the government for some time to come.