Denmark walks a tightrope

Date: 04/04/1996

WHENEVER anybody suggests that Denmark is playing the federalist game in Brussels, the accusation is immediately rebuffed by senior ministers and EU spokesmen from all the country's leading parties.

This is because accusations that the Copenhagen government is supporting a federalist agenda in Europe normally come from Denmark's strong Eurosceptic movement.

Anyone examining the Danish position paper on the Intergovernmental Conference, however, would privately acknowledge that there is clear evidence of a federalist strain running through it.

But federalism is not a word that can be used, as the treaty which emerges from the IGC process is likely to be put to a referendum. In such a plebiscite, the use of the word would do more for the No campaign than another large injection of funding from Sir James Goldsmith, who supported the anti-Maastricht campaign and helped those opposed to the treaty to score a major victory the first time around.

The Danish position paper supports the notion that a greater element of population size should be included in calculations on the future distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers. This is the closest so far that any of the smaller member countries have come to supporting the double-majority.

Denmark supports a strong and independent European Commission retaining its monopoly on initiatives, is in favour of strengthening the role of the European Court of Justice, promotes more co-decision for the European Parliament, and backs a strong enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity.

Those are clear elements of federalism in its purest form, as it would be interpreted by a German. But no one who listens to the ongoing Danish debate on Europe would get the impression that Copenhagen's stance at the IGC is more integrationist than that adopted by several other countries.

This is simply because the Danish EU debate always seems to be based on the 'worst-case-scenario' approach.

One example of this came after the publication of the latest issue of the magazine for members of the Eurosceptic June movement JuniBevægelsen, which holds two of the 16 Danish seats in the European Parliament. In an article about the future of the Western European Union (WEU), the magazine claimed that “the EU plans military intervention in Burundi”.

When accusations such as this are aired in national newspapers via letters to the editor, the government responds, not by saying that there are no such plans, but by insisting that Denmark is not ready to accept EU military intervention in Burundi.

Add to this various other scaremongering tactics ranging from claims that the EU is going to harmonise retirement pensions to suggestions that German police officers are to be allowed to operate on Danish soil - all of which have been met with firm denials from government ministers - and it is easy to understand why the public gets the impression that Denmark is acting as a brake on European integration.

With the referendum on 2 June 1992 in mind, all leading Danish politicians seem to have drawn the same lesson: avoid any discussion of 'if-then' scenarios and, if possible, avoid institutional questions and instead talk about the policies that the EU should be dealing with.

It is for this reason that Social Democrat Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, in his pre-Turin summit interviews, spent his time talking mainly about the need for a coordinated European effort to fight unemployment - although ironically it emerged last week that only 6&percent; of Danes think this should be a fundamental objective of the IGC.

Other favourite items mentioned in public discussions on the IGC agenda include the necessity for a more environmentally-friendly Europe and for more openness in the Union's institutions.

Thus it is that those who do not follow the Danish EU debate closely could easily be misled into believing that Denmark is yet another Eurosceptic country ready to act as the tail on the British Conservative dog.

But that would be a dangerous assumption because, in fact, Denmark is just the opposite. One of its main concerns during the Maastricht negotiations was - and will be yet again at this IGC - to distance itself from the UK.

The government's policy on Europe also has very strong support in the Danish parliament. Of course, in everyday politics, the opposition led by former Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen from the liberal party (Venstre) does its bit to provoke the government whenever possible.

But the fact is that the government could have asked for - and received - support for every comma in its IGC position paper from the two leading opposition parties, Venstre and the Konservative Folkeparti, if it had sought it.

It is only because of the significant role played by the Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) in securing the Edinburgh Agreement and the Yes vote at the second Danish Maastricht referendum that the government prefers to present the position paper as its own, without seeking the assent of other parties in the parliament (Folketinget).

This move was basically seen as an attempt by the government to keep its options open by not forcing the SF to take sides now, because it knows that it is going to need all the support it can get if it is to win another possible referendum on Europe.

With three referendums on European affairs within the last ten years, there is a clear public and political expectation that Denmark will hold another one on the outcome of this IGC, even though that will probably not be necessary on constitutional grounds.

The government has, however, been careful not to make any definite promises. Some Danish diplomats and politicians are toying with the idea that Copenhagen could avoid a plebiscite if neighbouring Sweden and Finland decided not to put the next treaty to a public vote.

But with the Edinburgh Agreement guaranteeing a referendum if there is any transfer of competences from the 'third pillar' on justice and home affairs to the EU's first pillar, or if Denmark signs up to Economic and Monetary Union or joins the WEU, it is hard to see how Copenhagen can avoid a public vote if the country wants to secure itself a place at the heart of European cooperation.

Polls show that there is a majority against lifting any of the four Danish reserves in the Edinburgh Agreement and, depending on how the question is asked, it is also hard to find evidence of much public support for further European integration.

The SF will play a key role in determining the outcome of the next referendum. The party argued against the Maastricht Treaty, but supported the Yes campaign in the second referendum after securing a political promise from the government that the reservations in the Edinburgh Agreement would form the basis of long-term Danish policy on Europe.

With Economic Affairs Minister Marianne Jelved constantly stressing the advantages for Denmark of joining EMU, the opposition asking for the country to become a member of the WEU and a majority of member states, including Denmark's Nordic neighbours, prepared to transfer certain areas from the third pillar into the first, the SF has recognised for a long time that the writing is on the wall.

These signs of a shift in long-term Danish EU policy are not, however, certain to continue beyond the end of this IGC, and strong forces within the ranks of the Socialists are now arguing that the party should re-establish its old ties with the Danish Eurosceptic movement.

But the party also contains a Euro-enthusiastic minority, including people like MEP John Iversen, former spokesman for Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard, and therefore any move in that direction would risk a damaging split.

This is a situation identical to the dilemma facing the government.

With the IGC slowly coming to life, Danish policy could perhaps best be described as walking a tightrope: a twin-track approach which involves the government acting in as pro-European a manner as possible in Brussels, while at the same time reassuring the public at home that its actions in Brussels are simply aimed at allowing for the enlargement of the Union by supporting the adjustments to the treaty necessary to bring this about.