Defence spending must rise if EU wants a force to be reckoned with

Date: 19/07/01

European defence spending continues to fall by nearly 5% a year. Unless this trend is halted, the EU's rapid reaction force will not be operationally effective, warns Geoffrey van Orden

BY 2003, the EU aims to have under its control a rapid reaction force of up to 60,000 military personnel which can be sustained for up to a year on military operations which include the most demanding - "peacemaking", or what used to be called war. The trouble is that these are not new forces, which would be a welcome addition to the pool of military resources available to the western democracies, but rather our same troops wearing different hats, having to respond to a different permutation of political masters.

I am wholly in favour of enhanced European military capabilities - forces restructured to address the new range of post-Cold War requirements; highly flexible and mobile; trained and equipped for both high and low-intensity operations, with state-of-the-art weaponry and support technology; interoperable with our closest allies.

The trouble is that this costs money and the European nations have shown little inclination to invest more in their military forces. On the contrary, the latest survey from the International Institute for Strategic Studies observes that "European defence spending in real terms, continues to fall at a rate of nearly 5% each year. R & D spending is falling by 2% a year and equipment procurement by European states is at its lowest level in decades."

The dramatic inadequacies displayed by the Kosovo campaign have clearly done nothing to reduce a downward trend. The military-technology backwardness of most European nations has become so great that it practically precludes them from acting as effective partners to the US in many high-intensity combat situations. Instead, the European preoccupation has been with institutional arrangements, motivated largely by political ambition - to empower the EU and, for many, to create a military capacity autonomous from that of the United States. The dangers of this approach are manifold. Instead of encouraging western unity in the face of new risks and challenges there will be division.

Key allies such as Turkey may be alienated. Troops which should be available for NATO tasks could be committed elsewhere and could soon find themselves out on a limb in a deteriorating situation without back-up from the US, our most powerful military ally. The unilateralist tendency in America will be strengthened and NATO will gradually cease to be the security organisation of first resort in the face of crisis.

These concerns could easily be overcome if, as a matter of course, a crisis was first discussed in NATO and decisions made there over the division of responsibility. The Alliance is already structured to enable a European-led military operation to be mounted if that was considered the most desirable or appropriate response. And this includes the involvement of non-NATO nations such as the "EU neutrals".

As things stand, the EU rapid reaction force will not be a capability enhancement as its component elements are already assigned for other possible missions. In any case, a rapid reaction capability already exists within NATO where the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) has been available since 1991 to undertake a wide range of tasks with the ability to deploy to any trouble spot within 7 to 14 days.

It has already been tested in conflict, participating in IFOR and KFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia and is extremely multinational in its composition, with 10 divisions of troops from 16 nations assigned.

Indeed the only significant European power which is not included ("neutrals" apart) is France, which has excluded itself from the integrated military structures of the Alliance.

On the face of it the ARRC was, and remains, a handy instrument for European force projection in the coming century, but it lacks both an EU seal of approval and the blessing of the French government.

If the prospective EU rapid reaction force were to include significant new combat formations, not just ones already assigned, and if this force was also earmarked for NATO operations, then there would be little substantive objection, particularly as it is already recognised that operational planning will have to be carried out by NATO staff at Mons.

The ideal scenario would be for the RRF effectively to become an additional ARRC but with French participation. There is really no need for the duplicative EU Military Committee as the necessary military advice for EU decision-makers could be provided by the well-established NATO Military Committee which, from time to time, could easily adapt to "European mode" without anyone having to leave the table. An EU force with NATO substance is a far better alternative than an EU force without substance and a weakened NATO. European nations must then begin to invest serious funds in R & D and improving military capabilities. Some 80% of ammunition fired in the Kosovo air campaign was delivered by US aircraft, while America is now 10-20 years ahead of Europe in regard to the revolution in military affairs.

There are three main areas in which European militaries are deficient. The first, 'deployability and mobility', requires investment in strategic lift and air-to-air refuelling.

The decision by nine European nations to buy a total of 212 of the new Airbus A400M military transport aircraft is a step in the right direction.

The second, 'effective engagement', requires purchase of high-technology systems to overcome the deficit in electronic warfare and precision all-weather strike capabilities.

Thirdly, European governments must invest in satellites and secure information and communications technology at both the strategic and operational levels. It is essential that the EU recognises that the future of its rapid reaction force is less about institutions than about capabilities, otherwise it will end up flying 12 stars and little else. Meanwhile, the UK and US, along with other serious players, should now engage in a damage limitation exercise on EU defence policy.

They must ensure that NATO's relevance and vitality as the western security organisation of first resort is not undermined, and that scarce defence resources are not frittered away on meretricious political projects with no military added value.

• Geoffrey van Orden is a British MEP and Conservative spokesman on foreign affairs and defence. A retired brigadier, he is a former head of NATO's international military staff secretariat. From 1995-99 he was a senior official in the European Commission dealing with foreign and security policy and terrorism.

Viewpoint article. European defence spending continues to fall by nearly 5% a year. Unless this trend is halted, the EU's rapid reaction force will not be operationally effective. Author is a British MEP and Conservative spokesman on foreign affairs and defence.