Cyprus: A derailment coming

Date: 17/04/04

Greek-Cypriots will say “no” to a UN peace proposal and therefore march alone into the European Union

ON THEIR side of the divided capital of Cyprus, young Turkish-Cypriots wearing T-shirts stamped with Evet (the Turkish for yes) are campaigning noisily in favour of reunifying the island. Hundreds of blue and yellow balloons - the European Union colours - are floated at their rallies, in anticipation of the benefits of membership, which include some €350m ($418m) in aid which may eventually be doled out to northern Cyprus.

Opinion polls suggest that in a referendum to be held throughout the island on April 24th, some 60% of Turkish-Cypriots will back a UN plan to put the island together again - even though it will oblige them to yield control over some rich farm-land, and to send most of the Turkish soldiers now on the island back home. But in some ways, it hardly matters what the Turkish-Cypriots think. All signs are that the Greek-Cypriots will reject the UN plan, and therefore exercise their right to join the EU alone.

The buoyant mood in the north is in sharp contrast to the sullen reaction of most Greek-Cypriots to the UN proposals. Billboards in southern Nicosia, which normally promote the latest cell-phones, feature the word Ochi (Greek for no) against a depressing dark background. Television screens are filled with nationalist politicians rehearsing the peace plan's drawbacks. Surveys suggest that only 12-15% of Greek-Cypriots are certain to endorse it.

This is not surprising. For in an emotional address that tugged on the deepest impulses in the Greek nationalist psyche, President Tassos Papadopoulos called on April 7th for a resounding rejection of the UN blueprint. After all, he implied, Greek Cyprus will on May 1st be entering the EU as a full member - so why should Greek-Cypriots worry if other countries call them stiff-necked or intransigent? Several respected Greek-Cypriots (including two ex-presidents) have warned against a “no” vote; the Greek government said tepidly on April 15th the plan had more “pros than cons” but Cypriots must decide. The Greek-Cypriot voters seem more swayed by the rhetoric of Mr Papadopoulos, who has pointed up the plan's faults and played down the drawbacks of rejection.

To any long-standing observer of the Cyprus question, a peculiar reversal is going on. At least since the bloody summer of 1974, Turkey and its Cypriot kin have enjoyed substantial power - thanks to a vast garrison, controlling nearly 40% of the island - while the Greek majority has held the moral and diplomatic advantage. The Greek-Cypriot administration has enjoyed a monopoly of international recognition and obtained a raft of UN resolutions calling on Turkish troops to withdraw. Whatever people thought of the events leading up to the 1974 conflict, most of the world sympathised with the 180,000 or so Greek-Cypriots who were forced to flee as Turkish troops overran the island's north, and voted accordingly at the UN.

In theory, both sides have been committed since 1977 to reuniting the island as a bizonal federation. But Greek-Cypriot sincerity was rarely tested because Rauf Denktash, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, was obligingly prepared to act as nay-sayer when a settlement looked likely.

Now the old balance is about to be reversed. The Turkish-Cypriots will earn a great many moral points by voting for the UN peace plan, while the Greek-Cypriots will make themselves deeply unpopular by their churlish rejection. But at least in their president's view, they can afford to be sanguine because they will soon enjoy the substantial benefit, which nobody can take away, of EU membership.

This is not how anyone planned things when, nearly five years ago, the Union declared that it was ready in principle to admit Turkey - and also, at a much earlier date, to accept Cyprus with or without a settlement of the island's conflict. This was a careful formula that enabled Greece to back away from its objections to Turkish membership; and was intended to promote a “win-win” solution in Cyprus which Mr Denktash, wary of any threat to his well-armed fief, could not veto.

In one of its aims, the EU strategy has partially succeeded: that of giving heart to pro-European moderates both among the Turkish-Cypriots and in Turkey itself. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's mildly Islamist prime minister, has devoted enormous political capital to persuading reluctant generals - for whom Cyprus is a strategic prize - that they should be ready to deliver their side of any Cypriot settlement.

General Hilmi Ozkok, a dove among Turkey's top brass who is now chief of the general staff, confirmed on April 13th that the army was, despite its reservations, willing to yield to parliament over Cyprus. That means that it would be prepared to scale down and virtually withdraw its garrison of nearly 40,000 troops as it would be required to do under a settlement.

Erdogan's hopes

Better still, moderates in the Turkish-Cypriot community have been emboldened to oppose Mr Denktash, whose unrecognised republic has a habit of prosecuting his critics. That in turn has strengthened the hand of Mr Erdogan in Ankara as he tries to overcome the foot-dragging power of conservative generals. The prime minister hopes that in December he will be rewarded for these efforts by a longed-for prize: a firm date for the start of negotiations - be they ever so long - on Turkey's membership of the Union.

But if the EU hoped that by ushering Cyprus into its ranks, it would encourage moderation among the island's Greek majority, it has been disappointed. Senior figures in Brussels are already bracing themselves for a diplomatic train wreck if, as is technically possible, Greek Cyprus uses its new-found membership of the Union to block any invitation to Turkey. At that point, a half-completed virtuous circle could become a thoroughly vicious one, with Greeks and Turks slipping back into a game of mutual provocation.

One commission official called the present situation on Cyprus a “real shame” with the potential to become a “real nightmare”. Mr Papadopoulos was never going to be a popular figure in Brussels, given his history of support for Serbian nationalism in the 1990s. But he may not care: any decisions on further enlargement require his assent, and in theory he can exercise that veto if he wants.

Carl Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister and UN envoy to the Balkans, has suggested that European leaders treat Mr Papadopoulos as a pariah. Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform, a think-tank, argues that the Greek-Cypriots will see a collapse in their “soft power ” - -their ability to win friends and assemble coalitions - if they are seen to abuse the privilege of EU membership.

But there is a suspicion in Brussels that if, as a result of Greek-Cypriot folly, there is a general derailing of EU policy in south-eastern Europe - and the invitation to Turkey collapses - some politicians from the Union's older states may quietly rejoice, even as they scold the Cypriots. Leaders of France's ruling UMP party said this month they would oppose early talks on Turkey's EU membership. How well it would suit them if Greek-Cypriot hotheads did the derailing, and then suffered the effects of the crisis which this policy may trigger.

Article predicts that the Greek Cypriots would vote 'no' to a UN peace proposal and therefore march alone into the EU.