Controlling outcomes: Voting power in the European Parliament 1979-2000

Abstract:

This article examines voting power in the directly elected European Parliament (1979-2000). The distribution of voting power among party groups is analysed under simple majority, 2/3, 3/4 and 3/5 majority rules with the standardised Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik voting indices. The share of seats controlled by each party group is compared to its share of a priori voting power. No party group has ever alone controlled the voting outcome, but on the other hand all groups possess at least some voting power. Nevertheless, the findings clearly indicate that the smaller groups are marginalised in the Parliament. The medium-sized groups have also relatively little voting power, but their ideological locations enable them to influence outcomes beyond their numerical strength. We discuss the practical implications of our findings for coalition behaviour in the chamber and for Parliament's influence in the EU policy process.