| Author (Person) | Cronin, David |
|---|---|
| Series Title | European Voice |
| Series Details | Vol.10, No.6, 19.2.04 |
| Publication Date | 19/02/2004 |
| Content Type | News |
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By David Cronin Date: 19/02/04 WHEN European Union foreign ministers consider adopting a more critical approach towards Russia next week, they will be doing so against a bizarre, blood-stained political backdrop. Despite not being a major issue in the December elections to the national parliament (Duma), the unresolved conflict in Chechnya is set to figure prominently in the remaining campaigning for the 14 March presidential poll. This is due both to the 6 February bomb blast in the Moscow metro, in which Chechen extremists are blamed for killing 39 people, and the "disappearance" of Vladimir Putin's arch enemy Ivan Rybkin (after going missing for five days, Rybkin claimed he was abducted in Ukraine, where he had gone to meet Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov). Back in Brussels, the effects of Silvio Berlusconi's buffoonery at last November's EU-Russia summit in Rome lingers on. On that occasion the Italian premier deviated from the agreed EU line when he publicly defended Putin over alleged human rights abuses in Chechnya, the continued deployment of Russian troops in Moldova and the arrest of Mikhail Khodorovsky, head of oil giant Yukos, apparently due to the latter's support for a political party hostile to the Russian president. In response to Berlusconi's gaffe, the European Commission unveiled a communication last week, urging "policy coherence" in the Union's dealings with Moscow. Due to be discussed by the EU's foreign ministers on Monday (23 February), the paper seeks that Putin should be left in no uncertainty in future that such issues as extra-judicial killings by Russian soldiers in Chechnya, the selective application of the law, or Moscow's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change are unpalatable to the Union. If the officials and politicians who represent the EU in contacts with Russia take these recommendations to heart, they will adopt a far more aggressive approach than heretofore; the communication says violations of human rights "should be raised vigorously and coherently by the EU and its member states". But will this make any difference on the ground in the former Soviet Union (FSU)? "I don't want to diminish the fact that you have to protest against the situation in Chechnya; the EU is absolutely entitled to heed the worries of its own population about the degradation of human rights," says Nina Bachkatov, co-editor of Inside Russia and the FSU. "But you cannot go in just protesting. "There is a kind of décollage [unsticking] between the Russia of ten years ago, when the EU developed its cooperation [with Moscow], and today. I'm always struck by the generational change, the fact that young people will not respond to pressure. People get fed up with being tutored and told what to do." Even though heavy casualties have been inflicted on Russian troops in Chechnya, opponents of the war have not made a huge impact on the political scene. Yabloko, the party most vocal against the military onslaught, failed to meet the 5% threshold for party list seats in the Duma in December (it is now mounting a legal challenge to the election results, based on reports by international observers that media coverage beforehand was skewed in favour of Putin's allies). In a recent piece for The Moscow Times, Alexander Golts argues that Putin owes his elevation to the presidency to unrest in Chechnya. In 1999, when he was prime minister in the final stages of Boris Yeltsin's presidency, Putin retaliated over the bombing of two apartment buildings in Moscow with an "anti-terrorist" operation in Chechnya, sparking a fresh conflict in the breakaway republic. "As a politician, Putin rose from the blood and muck of the Chechen war and they have left their mark on his entire presidency," wrote Golts. "As prime minister, with no formal control over the armed forces or the security agencies, Putin nevertheless took full responsibility for starting the second Chechen war. His trip to Grozny in a fighter jet showed everyone just what they wanted to see. The elderly were moved by the similarity to the famous scene of Stalin's arrival in the movie The Fall of Berlin. Middle-aged Russians were impressed by Putin's fitness - after a flight in a supersonic warplane, he was able to haul himself out of the cockpit. "Young people liked his cool, tough image: a mixture of Batman and James Bond." It appears there is a gulf of understanding between the EU authorities and Moscow on the Chechnya issue. For about a year, the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has been trying to open an office in neighbouring Ingushetia - another republic under Russian control - from which aid efforts for Chechen civilians would be coordinated. However, Moscow has refused to provide it with the necessary permission. The Russian authorities indicate they would allow ECHO to be based in Chechnya itself. But ECHO has ruled this out due to fears for the safety of its personnel. "If they wish to help Chechnya, they need to do so in Chechnya," says a spokesman for Russia's EU embassy. "There are no such security concerns as there were a year ago. If you don't want to go and work there you can find millions of pretexts. If you do wish to go there, you will find millions of opportunities to work there." Boris Makarenko, deputy director with the Centre for Political Technologies in Moscow, says he doubts a toughening of the EU's stance towards Putin would harm his domestic popularity. The effects of the disharmony within the EU underscored by Berlusconi's behaviour in November have not been as acutely felt in Russia as in western Europe, he says. "It is up to you guys in Europe to define what a more coherent approach to Russia would be. Rather than evaluating Mr Berlusconi's behaviour, we have other problems to worry about in Russia." Meanwhile, concerns have been expressed by EU officials that the Union's imminent expansion eastwards will cause a deterioration in relations with Moscow. The Russian side is at the moment reluctant to extend the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which underpins its EU ties on a raft of political and economic issues, to the ten incoming member states. EU officials believe that Russia is deliberately playing politics with what should be a mere formality of recognizing the Union's growth. For its part, Moscow has cited the lowering of tariffs at which the new EU countries export goods to Russia and the discrimination endured by ethnic Russians in the Baltic states as reasons for its reluctance. Talks are ongoing between the Commission and Moscow over how this impasse can be broken. The former has signaled its willingness to relax the current restrictions applying to Russian iron exports to the EU. However, officials indicate they are not prepared to capitulate to any demands that controls at the EU's external borders be weakened to allow Russian citizens to enter the Union more easily. EU-Russia trade is currently worth some €78 billion per year. But Nina Bachkatov believes its substantial value does not necessarily give Brussels huge political leverage with Putin's government: "The idea that Russia has to sell energy to the EU is not true. There are other major markets - like China." However, a Commission aide dealing with Russia offers a different analysis: "Russia is too important a political and economic partner for the EU to afford the current poor results of our relations. They are poor in terms of quality and in terms of quantity. We have endless meetings between senior officials, but the results are not commensurate with the intensity of the efforts made." |
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| Source Link | http://www.european-voice.com/ |
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| Countries / Regions | Russia |
