Charlemagne. When to call Turkey

Wrangling over Turkey's entry talks reflects broader doubts about the European Union's direction

ENLARGEMENT has been one of the European Union's great successes, bringing stability and democracy to parts of the continent which have had too little of either. But the policy is about to be put to its biggest test. On October 3rd, the EU is due to open negotiations with the biggest and most important country to have asked for membership so far. That country is Turkey.

Turkey first applied to join what was then the EEC in 1959. The two sides signed an association agreement in 1963 (implicitly accepting that Turkey could be a candidate); a customs union in 1995; and the EU officially accepted Turkey as a candidate for entry in 1999. Turkey has, in short, been asking to join Europe for so long that its application is starting to look old and moth-eaten - so much so that some diplomats and politicians seem to have forgotten the strategic reasons for entertaining it.

The long period of fobbing off Turkey is now over. Last December, EU heads of government promised to start negotiations on October 3rd if Turkey met just two more conditions (which it has done). To get this far, Turkey has taken such dramatic steps as abolishing the death penalty, accepting Kurdish as a language in schools, scrapping state security courts, revising the penal code and tightening civilian control over the army.

This is a last chance, for both sides. Turkish patience with EU obstructiveness is running out, as is European willingness to accept new members. Last December, the French, German and Dutch leaders, among others, agreed to start talks. They might not do so now - France and the Netherlands after their lost referendums on the EU constitution, Germany because of its impending election. Angela Merkel, the most likely winner, has said she will respect European processes that are under way when she takes office, which would include the Turkish talks if they start on October 3rd. But if the date slips, Ms Merkel might want to reconsider: she is strongly against Turkey's membership.

All this makes it worrying that, as curtain-up nears, the EU is suffering from a bad case of stage fright. Two issues threaten to abort the talks: Turkey's refusal to recognise Cyprus, and the desire of some countries to offer Turkey something less than full membership. It is obvious to all (including the Turks) that Turkey must recognise Cyprus eventually; indeed, that is one reason why the Cypriots and Greeks have supported the entry talks. The question is whether it must do so before they even start. This week, the French government accepted a diplomatic declaration that would let the talks begin without recognition. Cyprus still objects, but nobody pays much heed to its views.

Yet even if this first problem responds to treatment, it is not certain the second will. This is the threat that some members might insist on putting a “privileged partnership” into the framework document for negotiations, as a back-up in case membership talks fail. The Turks see this as an insult. Wrangling is likely to continue until the last minute. The best that can be said is that the chances of the talks starting on time are greater than they were two weeks ago and probably better than 50:50.

Answering the eastern question

All of these last-minute wobbles reflect an underlying ambiguity about Turkey. Clearly, it is a special case. By 2015 it will be larger than any other EU state by population, which has unsettling implications for its voting weight and representation in the European Parliament. The EU spends most of its money on farming and aid to poor regions - and Turkey is amply provided with both. In every previous enlargement, there were doubts about the readiness of the applicants to assume the obligations of membership. This time the biggest doubts may be about the ability of the club to absorb the would-be member.

Yet rejecting Turkey's bid for membership would do little to solve the difficulties its application raises. The budget needs to be reformed whether Turkey is in or out. Europe's economies must create more jobs whether or not Turkish workers get free movement of labour (which they probably won't). Popular dissatisfaction with the EU exists regardless of Turkish membership. A majority of Europeans say they are undecided about Turkey, rather than actively hostile.

Were Turkish membership to be rejected, the EU's existential problems would not disappear. Indeed, they might get worse. For a start, rejection would cause a crisis in Turkey. The government is an uneasy coalition of religious nationalists and westernising moderates. It is under strain from a renewed upsurge of Kurdish terrorist violence. A simultaneous failure of the government's EU policy might break apart the coalition, and even lead some Turks to look for an alternative such as a link with Russia or other countries to Turkey's east.

The problems for Europe would be less dramatic but no less profound. After September 11th, taking Turkey into the club is no longer just a question of helping a big and strategically important country to modernise. It is a test of whether the EU, and the West as a whole, has any role in encouraging moderate and democratic Islam. To precipitate a crisis in the nearest big Muslim country, and one that is both democratic and secular, would be a colossal blunder. Turkey may not be a model for democracy throughout the Middle East: Arabs certainly do not see it as such. But rejecting Turkey would still be taken by many Arab countries as rank hypocrisy or even racism by the West.

A few Europeans might justify the wreckage as a necessary cost of defending EU integration. But since the problems of popular support, the budget and so on exist regardless of Turkey, its rejection is unlikely to produce the “deeper” Europe they crave. The French and Dutch referendums have kyboshed further integration for quite a while, and perhaps for ever. Rejecting Turkish membership would probably halt other enlargements too. Europe would end up neither wider nor deeper; merely static, and with its south-eastern border in turmoil.

Commentary feature argues that the wrangling within the EU over starting entry talks for Turkey to join the Union reflects broader doubts about the EU's direction.