Charlemagne: The Franco-German monster

Date: 25/10/03

It has struggled back to life, but to what end?

RATHER like Frankenstein's monster, the Franco-German relationship has a habit of appearing dead for long periods, only to spring to life and start crashing around once more. Early last year, many commentators pronounced the monster dormant, if not definitively deceased. The German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and the French president, Jacques Chirac, were known to get on badly. The two countries fell out spectacularly at a summit in Nice in late 2000. Germany was said to be increasingly irritated by French intransigence over agricultural reform. And the French were fretful that a unified Germany was looking east, and no longer had eyes for Marianne.

Then, in October 2002, the Franco-German relationship miraculously revived. Mr Schröder and Mr Chirac settled their differences over agriculture and the budget. Just as significant as the fact of agreement was how it was reached - at a bilateral meeting just before an EU summit in Brussels, with the deal simply presented to other European leaders. And since that dramatic moment, the relationship has gone from strength to strength.

In January the two countries held high-profile celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the 1963 Elysee treaty that marked Franco-German reconciliation. At the convention on Europe's future they presented joint constitutional proposals. The two governments have held joint cabinet meetings and set up countless combined official groups. They stood shoulder-to-shoulder against the American-led drive to wage war on Saddam Hussein. In March, they put forward joint plans (with Belgium and Luxembourg) to set up a European defence headquarters separate from NATO. The renewed closeness was epitomised at the most recent EU summit by Mr Schröder's invitation to Mr Chirac to stand in for him on the final day. Journalists amused themselves at the closing press conference by asking the French president questions in German, a language he does not speak.

Behind the hilarity, France and Germany are making two serious points. First, they will continue to have a closer relationship with each other than with any other EU countries. And second, the Franco-German motor will continue to drive the process of European integration. But what was relatively uncontroversial when there were just six or 12 members is much less acceptable in a Union of 25. However much the French and Germans insist that their relationship serves the wider European cause, others are suspicious. Many countries resented the way that France and Germany presumed to speak for “Europe” over Iraq, and they made their resentment felt by writing letters of support for the Americans. These countries are equally queasy about the Franco-German effort to press ahead with a separate EU defence identity, fearing that it could undermine NATO. There is a risk that the Franco-German relationship, far from uniting Europe, may end up dividing it - and in the most sensitive possible area, the formation of military alliances.

French and German policymakers are aware of this danger. A recent paper by a group of young(ish) French and German diplomats and journalists, widely circulated in Paris and Berlin, tries to propose some solutions (“France et Allemagne: le leadership se mérite”, at http://www.europartenaires.info-europe.fr). It acknowledges that “on Iraq there was a common perception in Brussels that the Germans and French presented the other Europeans with a fait accompli in an unacceptable manner.” It adds that “we must absolutely stop giving the impression to future member states that they represent a disagreeable problem.”

And the paper's proposed solution? The French and Germans should press ahead with deeper integration, for example in defence. But they should do so within the framework of the EU, and make it clear that any such pioneer group remains open to all EU members. Yet for all its soothing words, the paper is uncompromising, both about France's and Germany's right to exert “leadership” in the EU and about the direction Europe should take. Regrettably, it says, many countries have joined the Union “without appreciating the political significance of joining. This error should not allow any latecomer member-states to deny the political end-point of European construction.” The implied threat is spelled out later. “To ignore these realities could lead future French and German governments, under the pressure of public opinion, to defend their interests more brutally and to take actions outside the EU treaties.”

Pioneers and laggards

If other EU members try to block the deeper integration that the French and Germans want, in other words, the two countries might just press ahead - outside the framework of the EU, if need be. Such a prospect is enough to make their partners pause. It may be one reason why Britain appears to be softening its opposition to the Franco-German military plans. As ever, the British hope is that, by joining the latest Franco-German wheeze, they will be able to edit out some of its more objectionable features, such as a mutual defence guarantee or a wholly separate EU headquarters. In the short term this strategy may work, as the others know that a European defence identity without Britain would be pointless. In the longer term, and over other issues, however, the French and Germans may not back down. One of Mr Schröder's closest advisers argued in a private briefing at the recent EU summit that the early stages of European defence co-operation were analogous to the early stages of the creation of a monetary union. “Not that I'm saying it will take as long as 30 years,” he added reassuringly - or ominously.

If France and Germany do try to lead the European Union towards some form of closer political union, they may find that some followers drop away. In that case the end-game may be what the new paper describes as “the negation of the European Union - a Metternich-style alliance at the heart of the EU.” But might that be what some secretly want?

Major commentary feature looks at the Franco-German relationship in the context of the EU.

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