Charlemagne: The Angela and José show

But Helmut and Jacques, they're not

THEY are Europe's odd couple: she, the cautious anti-communist physicist, who wants the European constitution but says economic reform can be delayed; he, the animated former Maoist turned law professor, who bangs on about economic reform but says that the constitution should be postponed. Mismatched as they may seem, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Commission's president, have struck up the most important political relationship in the European Union.

On successive days last week, the two gave speeches about the EU that could have been planned in concert, with an eye on the first half of next year when Germany takes over the presidency of the EU. Both called for more work on the constitution, albeit with differing degrees of urgency; less red tape; and more consumer protection. If anybody is directing the EU (admittedly, a big if), it is this pair from Germany and Portugal.

Their partnership has come about faute de mieux. True believers in European integration always whinge about "lack of leadership", but that lack is palpable right now. Only 26% of British voters approve of the job Tony Blair is doing as prime minister, making him the least loved Labour prime minister since the war. Barely a fifth of French voters approve of Jacques Chirac's performance as president. These levels of support would discourage any sane politician from reopening the contentious issue of the EU constitution in France or Britain. In Italy Romano Prodi has gone from narrow electoral victory to popular disenchantment without even the intervening stage of forming a government. The Polish coalition has brought in a virulently anti-European populist party to shore up its majority. The Dutch are still looking inwards. With Euroscepticism growing in almost every EU member, no leader besides Ms Merkel has the political capital to take risks for the sake of wider Europe.

But Ms Merkel and Mr Barroso have more in common than not being consumed by domestic concerns. Both are from the centre-right. Both are fervent Atlanticists. Both put the slightly awkward combination of improving ties with America and cutting red tape at the top of their agendas. During the contest for the presidency of the European Commission in 2004, Ms Merkel (then in opposition) quietly backed Mr Barroso. By winning the chancellorship, she liberated him from the legacy of his own selection. Mr Chirac and her predecessor, Gerhard Schroder, had promoted a Belgian candidate instead; both criticised Mr Barroso for being an Anglo-Saxon ultra-liberal. Ms Merkel has lifted the albatross of Franco-German hostility from his neck.

The two have been able to do things for one another. When Mr Chirac toyed again with the idea of a "core Europe" (some countries advancing swiftly towards closer integration), Mr Barroso and Ms Merkel were among those who squelched him. Mr Barroso decided not to fight for full liberalisation of services, which the commission had proposed, and instead accepted a diluted version passed by the European Parliament--much to the delight of Ms Merkel, since the compromise was largely designed by German MEPs carrying out her bidding. For her part, she has chosen not to oppose the opening of membership talks with Turkey, even though this is a neuralgic point for her party.

An obvious parallel is the alliance of the 1980s between Helmut Kohl, the previous Christian Democrat chancellor before Ms Merkel, and Jacques Delors, then European Commission president, which helped to pave the way for the single currency, perhaps the biggest step so far towards European integration. But if anybody imagines that, some time next year, the Merkel-Barroso duo will get the EU to take another stride towards closer union, they may be sorely disappointed.

Ms Merkel is no Helmut Kohl. For her, European policy certainly matters, but it is not top of her agenda. Although she helped to broker the EU's budget deal last year, she, unlike Mr Kohl, does not have money to throw around to help persuade people to agree. Ms Merkel also finds herself in a minority on a couple of the biggest issues facing the EU (which Mr Kohl rarely did). Turkey is one, Russia the other. Most governments want Turkey in; most are desperately looking for ways to diversify away from Russian gas. Germany is dubious about Turkey, and is building a pipeline across the Baltic that will increase its dependence on Russia and upset its eastern neighbours.

In search of supporting actors

Mr Kohl and Mr Delors also needed other support, notably from Francois Mitterrand of France. A new French president will come next year, but it would be foolish to expect him (or her) to transform the EU. France is now the most pessimistic country about the future of the EU; a recent poll found almost nobody who regretted their vote against the EU constitution last year. Few in Brussels expect Gordon Brown, Mr Blair's likely successor, to turn into an EU enthusiast.

And just as Ms Merkel is not Mr Kohl, so today's Germany is not that of the 1980s, which accepted (albeit reluctantly) its role as "locomotive of the world". Now Germany is a drag on growth in Europe, as it painfully improves its competitiveness through below-average wage rises.

Ms Merkel's domestic position, and thus her capacity to act in Europe's name, may now be at a peak. Tensions are building within her coalition. She has been riding high on the revival of business and consumer confidence, yet that confidence is being repeatedly contradicted by disappointing output figures. If Germany's recovery peters out and her honeymoon with voters fades, her ability to fight EU disenchantment in Germany will ebb too--and her political friendship with Mr Barroso will no longer be the strong influence it is now. That would leave the EU pretty much where it was last year, uncertain in the face of rising Euroscepticism and low growth.

Commentary feature on the relationship between the German Chancellor and the European Commission President: article asks if it the most important political relationship in the EU at the moment.