Charlemagne: Barcelona dreams

The European Union's awkward efforts to reform its southern neighbours

AMERICA can force countries to jump, but Europeans are better at inducing them to do it voluntarily. That is the European view. Their approach has worked brilliantly with the new and prospective members of the European Union, and had mixed results in the trickier parts of the Balkans. But, since September 2001, the Union's efforts to "spread stability" have faced an even harder challenge - how to influence the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East, which have no prospect of ever joining the club.

Ten years ago, the EU launched a set of policies, dubbed the Barcelona process, that attempted to sweeten that neighbourhood through diplomatic patience, policy advice and some osmosis. This weekend, leaders from around the Mediterranean gather in the Spanish city to review how their efforts have gone so far, and to try to improve them. Much hangs on the outcome.

The EU sprinkles a total of almost euro3 billion ($3.5 billion) a year, in grants and loans, from Morocco to Jordan, more than it gives to the former Soviet Union and almost as much as America ladles out to Egypt and Israel. Since American aid is largely military, the EU is now by far the most generous civilian donor in this turbulent area. The Barcelona process also provides the only regional forum in which Israel routinely sits down to talk to its Arab neighbours. It has become a meeting-place for protagonists in the supposed clash of civilisations, bringing together part of the West with a chunk of the Muslim world. It is also a rare-ish example of convincing, collective action by the Union - although France brings some national baggage to dealings with Algeria.

Above all, it is a test of a "third way" for western countries to deal with Muslim countries. Bombing them into democracy is not proving an easy triumph in Iraq. Leaving them to their own devices seems to be leading to government insanity in Iran. The European approach was ahead of its time, when it began, in 1995, to use economic incentives and the strengthening of civil society as tools to encourage reform. All countries bar Syria have signed tariff-cutting deals that are supposed to lead to a free-trade zone with the EU by 2010. The process is intended to bring about significant economic integration with the EU for these Muslim countries, along with some involvement in their domestic regulation by Europeans. In other words, the Barcelona process is a prime example of the use of Europe's soft power, applied gradually.

And it has been a flop. At least, that is what many European diplomats think. The free-trade zone is unlikely to be up and running by 2010, although most tariffs should have been cut substantially by then. If the intention was to foster democracy, the Europeans have little to show for their money. Indeed, any elections that have been held in the region seem to owe more to American abruptness than to European patience. If the aim was to transform the economic and social affairs of the Muslim Middle East, the picture is mixed, at best. There has been little reform in the three biggest countries: Egypt, Algeria and Syria.

There are several explanations for this disappointing performance. The EU's policies have been too gradual in countries that feel immune to pressure, whether from below or from outside. Because Israel is a partner, Barcelona has often been hostage to the Palestinian peace process. The EU's efforts in the region range over areas such as transport, energy and agriculture, which, back in Brussels, are run by people who do not often consider thinking of the Muslim world to be part of their job description. If you add doubts about whether the EU can really afford its spending in the region, it is easy to see why internal problems stop it using its potential influence to the full.

But before concluding that the Barcelona process is a waste of time and money, it is worth asking if it has been quite the flop many people consider. The dispensing of economic advice is part of the process, so the EU can claim credit for helping to create (in every county bar Lebanon) macroeconomic stability. Most important, the EU's policy offered a stepping stone to three Mediterranean countries that are now members (Cyprus and Malta) or negotiating to join (Turkey).

A soft test-bed

The biggest test is whether EU soft power can work in places that do not have the powerful incentive of membership. Perhaps not in Egypt. But Morocco's reform of family law (which increases women's rights) was based partly on European advice. Recent economic reforms in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority stemmed from agreements with the EU. This does not mean that reforms would not have happened otherwise. But they might have been done differently, and possibly badly (helping countries in transition is one area where the EU has technical expertise, gained in central and eastern Europe). The record of the Barcelona process, in short, has been success in one group of countries (admittedly, the easy ones); failure in another (those with the least appetite for reform); and partial achievement in a third (those that wanted change anyway).

That is nothing to be ashamed of. But the impact of the EU's policies is likely to be still more uneven in future, partly because the policies themselves will probably change. The meeting in Barcelona this weekend is likely to offer more money to countries that meet more demanding political conditions. This will give the process some of the aggressive conditionality that it has so far lacked. Governments may also, usefully, consider extending their free-trade agreements to cover services and agriculture; and even start thinking about how best to talk about some sensitive military matters, such as weapons of mass destruction.

The lesson of the past ten years is not that soft power does not work when it comes to the Arab or Muslim world. It is that it will work only in some countries - and that there, among the coalitions of the willing, it needs to be speeded up.

Commentary feature reviews the Euromed Process at its tenth anniversary, November 2005.

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