Can he crush the united colours of revolution?

Date: 15/09/05

The intention of the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is crystal clear. "In our country, there will be no pink or orange, nor even a banana revolution," he has said.

With a real sense of urgency he has set about the task of preventing his opponents emulating the opposition in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, countries that have experienced bloodless 'democratic revolutions' in the past five years.

The Belarusian opposition, including its youth groups, has history to overcome. It has traditionally been fractured and key moments of mobilisation and protest - including presidential elections in 2001 and parliamentary elections and a constitutional referendum in 2004 - have passed without Lukashenko's authoritarian regime being shaken.

What form protest might take is still in the process of being worked out. But for Zubr, one of the opposition youth groups, the models are the Serbian and Ukrainian revolutions. The plans of Malady Front, arguably the largest opposition youth group, for a major information campaign and, if there is fraud in the elections, street rallies and strikes, also fits that model.

Iryna Vidanava, a former co-ordinator for the Assembly of Belarusian Pro-Democratic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the editor-in-chief of Studentskaya Dumka, says: "As in 2001, the activists of these [youth] groups will be the major 'work force'...for the democratic candidate, the civic mobilisation campaign and the independent [election] observation team... They will be bringing out their supporters to distribute materials and knock on doors, organising and participating in 'get out the vote' campaigns."

She adds: "Youth groups will have to cover all segments of Belarusian youth and co-ordination of their efforts is therefore crucial. Some groups will focus on the political campaign. Some will conduct a positive youth-mobilisation campaign trying to convince young people to vote. Some youth groups will focus on bringing young people out on the streets to protest against [electoral] falsifications. It is only youth groups who will be able to come up with the message, ideas and language that will appeal to young people."

Some of these initiatives will simply depend on getting bodies out, but grassroots activities on the scale these groups envisage requires money. And the issue of where that money comes from may help determine how the opposition's activities are viewed and their chances of success: the use of foreign funds in Georgia and Ukraine prompted commentators in former Soviet states such as Russia and also in some Western newspapers to question how homegrown the revolution was. Lukashenko has, of course, used this for propaganda purposes, portraying the opposition as a collection of Western lackeys.

The source of the youth groups' funding is varied. Yury Karetnikau, leader of Pravy Aljans (Right Alliance), says the money his organisation receives comes almost exclusively - 90% - from members, with the rest coming from local businessmen. "We made it a condition for our members: if you feel that you are a friend of the organisation, then you must pay skladki [donations]. That is 3,000 rubles [about €1] a month, but there are people who give more, about 5-10,000 rubles."

Jauhen Afnagel, the leader of Zubr, says its funds come "from our friends, in Belarus and outside Belarus". How much comes from within Belarus is unclear. In Ukraine, much of the funding for the opposition campaign came from local patrons, but Belarus has no private businessmen remotely as wealthy as those in Ukraine (or in Russia).

Nor is it clear how much is coming from abroad. "All kinds of organisations give us funding," says Barys Garetzky, deputy leader of Malady Front. "For five years we have been co-operating closely with the Swedish Social Democrats [...] Through Ukraine, we have big plans for co-operation with the Soros Foundation, which is interested in the Enough! campaign; the Soros Foundation has helped bring together many youth organisations, covering the whole of Belarus."

The US-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has provided some of the most active support. The same has been done by some other private foreign institutions, including a Polish organisation, the East European Democratic Centre (IDEE).

The US government is also providing help, though the extent and nature of that support is unclear. Marina Shubina of the US Embassy in Minsk would merely say that "the US government supports a broad range of youth groups and believes that the development of democratic values among youth is a priority of US government assistance".

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Zubr representatives in a visit to Lithuania this April. Studentskaya Dumka has in the past received support from the US State Department.

The European Commission says it does not fund political activities in Belarus. It is, though, channeling fresh funds to Belarusian NGOs, through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and the Decentralised Co-operation Program. It is also funding a Deutsche Welle service due to broadcast into Belarus starting in November (in Russian, controversially) and has set aside À8.7 million in 2005 to support of democracy and human rights in Belarus.

Nor has it excluded a priori the possibility of a special fund to help Belarusian civil society. Given Lukashenko's crackdown on civil society, even such apolitical funding may be viewed by the Belarusian president as being political.

But aid - from whatever source - is of background importance, activists insist. "If you see the Ukrainian experience - with all this unlimited support of Russia for [defeated Prime Minister Viktor] Yanukovich - then you see that Russian influence is important, but not the main factor," says Afnagel of Zubr. "The US and the EU will support democratic changes, but their influence is not the main thing. Everything will depend on our people, and not on external factors."

That may explain why 'external factors' have failed in Belarus before. In 2001, the US government offered financial support to the opposition for a campaign modeled on Serbia's street protests in 2000, the model later successfully adjusted in Georgia, Ukraine and - to a lesser degree - in Kyrgyzstan.

But that blueprint produced little in Belarus. The defeat in 2001 sent many in the opposition into a collective depression and convinced them that Lukashenko's position was impregnable.

That depression has now lifted. Lukashenko's style of rule is changing. His authoritarian character has always been apparent, but it is now increasingly intrusive and menacing.

He has strengthened the security forces, effectively elevated the position of the secret police (giving them authority over defense forces and border guards), increased the legal powers of the KGB (allowing secret servicemen to enter homes at will and tap telephones more extensively), and has passed a new law allowing police to shoot in peacetime if ordered to by the president.

Lukashenko's clampdowns and tightening control may be designed to strengthen his power, but they are eating away at his popular legitimacy.

• Andres Schipani-Aduriz is an Argentinian-born journalism student at Cardiff University. Alyaksandr Kudrytski is a Transitions Online correspondent in Minsk. A longer version of this article can be found at www.tol.cz

Article takes a look at the political situation in Belarus, where President Alexander Lukashenko was determined to prevent a revolution similar to the one in other Eastern European states.