Can China and Japan ever forgive and forget?

Date: 10/11/05

After 60 years there is still no prospect of a true reconciliation between China and Japan. The recent visit by Junichiro Koizumi, Japan's prime minister, to a war shrine in central Tokyo was condemned by the Chinese.

The Chinese ambassador to Japan, Wang Yi, said: "Koizumi must shoulder the historical responsibility for damaging Sino-Japanese relations."

The re-emergence of these tensions should not be surprising but good Sino-Japanese relations are essential for a stable Asia and a stable Asia is essential for a stable world. A serious breakdown would be very dangerous.

Franco-German reconciliation after the Second World War was much easier, for at least four reasons: history, politics, culture and leadership.

German school textbooks tell the truth about the Second World War: Japanese textbooks do not, and the China-Japan textbook controversy does not begin with the 1937-45 war but dates back a further 20-30 years. A broadly common interpretation of history is an essential pre-condition to full Sino-Japanese reconciliation. Unless current teaching changes, future generations of leaders will be influenced by what they have, unfortunately, been taught.

The Communist threat loomed large in the thoughts of European leaders, even before the end of the Second World War. This gave influence to those determined not to repeat the mistakes of Versailles in 1919. Harry Truman, the then US president, and George Marshall, his secretary of state, saw the need for the re-integration of (West) Germany into the western order, so as to ensure it did not fall to Communism.

By 1949 China was Communist and Japan was seen as a potential force against Communism. Many in Washington also mistakenly believed that China was controlled by Moscow. It was understandable that Japan and not China was rebuilt by the US. But the decision to retain Emperor Hirohito and the failure to compel the Japanese people to acknowledge its collective guilt as a nation was a serious error of policy.

Other neighbouring nations are unable to forget the war. Korean antagonism to Japan runs deep and there is a need for the region's two largest democracies and market econo-mies to work together.

There are two important cultural dimensions. West-erners have little difficulty in saying sorry and losing face is a far less important factor than it is with the Japanese or Chinese. You cannot simply translate into either language: "I am sorry for what I have done. I apologise."

It is possible to draw a distinction between German leaders and the nation as a whole but the same cannot be applied to Japan. Germans committed huge atrocities but the German army in general observed the Geneva Conventions. The worst crimes were committed against civilians. But Japanese soldiers were guilty of consistent, and often gratuitous, violence against prisoners of war. The Japanese nation, with its militaristic culture seemed to support cruelty.

Finally, Europe was blessed with exceptional leaders: Truman, Marshall, Charles de Gaulle, Robert Schuman, Konrad Aden-auer and behind them, Jean Monnet. They were not solely influenced by the defence against Commun-ism and were far-sighted enough to see the mutual benefits that could flow from a Europe integrated around France and Germany.

What then is the solution to the problem of Sino-Japanese reconciliation? Only the two peoples can achieve it and Westerners can at best play a catalytic and advisory role.

First, the context must be changed from bilateral to multilateral. China and Japan should join together in promoting the establishment of a series of East Asian frameworks initially embracing perhaps economics, finance, information, health and culture. Membership of the different frameworks would not necessarily be the same (a sort of 'enhanced cooperation'). Second, these frameworks should be underpinned by a 10-20 year promotion of mutual understanding throughout the region. Within this context, sensitive issues must be addressed, including differing perceptions of history, an issue not limited to Japan and China. Current education would be examined as a priority.

Third, Western policy towards the region must support this approach. 'Containment', 'balance of power' and 'divide-and-rule' thinking must be banished. China, as well as Japan, must be seen as strategic partners and not as strategic competitors. Regional integration and governance must strengthen the world order.

In sum, it is suggested that true Sino-Japanese reconciliation cannot be achieved bilaterally and therefore a multilateral solution is advocated: regional integration is in any case a worthwhile objective in itself.

Unrealistic? Perhaps at this precise moment, but without such a vision the region risks being condemned to a replay of history. And past unrealistic visions, after all, include the European Union, the euro and the sudden dismantling of the Iron Curtain.

• Stanley Crossick is founding chairman of the European Policy Centre. He writes here in a personal capacity.

Commentary feature taking a look at the prospects for reconciliation between China and Japan. The author draws comparisons with Franco-German post-war reconciliation and makes suggestions how to tackle the problem.