Bush shows Europe how to handle Russia

By Robert Cottrell

Date: 12/05/05

Delivered against a backdrop of bitter arguments between the Baltics and Russia over the causes and consequences of the Second World War, George Bush's speech in Riga last Friday was a miniature masterpiece. It said what everyone needed to hear. The Russians had been heroes to defeat Hitler. The Balts had been heroes to beat back half a century of Soviet occupation. The West should remember Yalta and the post-war division of Europe, with a proper sense of shame.

There was even a Freudian slip fine enough to win squawks of pleasure from the press room. Bush encouraged the Balts to follow America's lead in bringing "equal injustice" to all citizens.

The visit was a fantastic morale-booster for the Balts and by the same token a reminder of how little comparable support they have got from most of their partners within the European Union. For years they have endured a Russian hate campaign aimed at dividing their societies and undermining their governments.

But what is in this for the Americans? Why challenge Russia by reaching out now to the Balts, splendid as the Balts are? The element of idealism in US foreign policy is usually real enough, but so is the calculation and the self-interest.

America's policy towards Russia and its neighbours looks to have been changed, or clarified, by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

Many Europeans saw the Orange Revolution as an inconvenience. It would trouble relations with Russia. The EU did not want another candidate the size of Ukraine.

But Americans saw it differently, as the most inspiring event in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolt of the Baltic states. They were amazed by the scale and the relative ease of Viktor Yushchenko's triumph, even though they had long worked for something along those lines.

The real surprise was that, when the spark finally caught, Vladimir Putin's Russia could not reach over the border and damp down the fire. Now Putin's weakness, revealed and increased by the loss of Ukraine, has become the new driver of American policy.

All ambiguity has disappeared from America's language on Belarus. It wants a revolution there next. In the Black Sea region too, it is throwing hesitation to the winds. A year ago, the American message to Georgia was, roughly: "quieten down and stop making problems for Russia". This week Bush was heading for Tbilisi after Moscow, as if to say: "it's time to stop Russia making problems for you".

The Americans seem almost to have lost interest in Putin himself. He cannot or will not deliver what they most want - more oil exports, more press freedom at home, an end to nuclear co-operation with Iran, less weapons sales to China and peace in the North Caucasus. Different bits of his government are grabbing policy for themselves, as they did in Yeltsin's day.

Still, Putin is by no means the worst Russian leader the Americans have known. He can be helpful sometimes. So they will give him face, while he lasts. Bush did that, very well, in Moscow this week.

But the American interest has shifted to who, and what, comes next. The nightmare would be a strong anti-democratic Russia allied with a strong anti-democratic China. America's interest thus lies in encouraging either a strong democratic Russia, or, failing that, a weak Russia regardless of government.

In either case, prising away the countries around Russia's borders, and building or reinforcing friendly democracies there, is a step in the right direction. It certainly beats pretending, as much of Europe does, that Putin's Russia is a like-minded country going through some short-term difficulties.

• Robert Cottrell is Central Europe correspondent for The Economist.

Analysis feature on US policies towards Eastern Europe and Russia.