Built to last: A political architecture for Europe

Book abstract:

This book provides an appraisal of the various reform proposals put forward to the Convention on the Future of Europe. These concern the huge problem of the future of the European Union's 'political architecture', that is to say its structure, organisation and overall governing framework. Broadly, the writers advocate an 'evolution' towards a comprehensive presidential system for the EU, but one which would leave its democratic pedigree and constitution intact. Unless, the writers argue, some political reforms are implemented, economic progress will also become obstructed.

By comparing the two significant methods of democratic governance, parliamentary and presidential, the book asks which system will be the more effective for the EU in the long term, examining the advantages and disadvantages of both. To this end, the book is divided into four parts. After part one, which provides introductory material to the problems raised and discussed, part two turns to the question of task allocation in an integrated Europe. This includes an exploration of various diverse issues, like public goods, redistributive programmes, economic problems like the single market, the external trade policy, tax policy and stabilisation policy, emerging issues like internal and external security, and broader concerns over legislation, financing and the transference of executive authority. In part three, on decision-making in the EU, there are analyses of the challenges facing institutional reform, in terms, for example, of the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament, but also of long run and short run 'options' which again contrast the parliamentary to the presidential systems for governing Europe. This section also contains comparisons of intergovernmentalist and federalist models, as well as issues like voting rules. Part four concludes the book, by assessing the areas where and where not a European government is required, as well as the questions of subsidiarity and a flexible constitution, the extent of power and decision-making strengths in institutions like the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament, and finally the problems of ratification, amendment, and enhanced co-operation.