Battles over final status of Kosovo should end with accession to EU

By Dana Spinant

Date: 01/04/04

APPOINTING a special representative and sending more troops - this is the answer the European Union and its member states gave to the recent crisis in Kosovo, after explosive clashes between ethnic Serbs and Albanians left 28 dead and some 600 injured last month.

Although these well-meaning moves are set to contribute to appeasing violence in the province for the time being, they fail to address the underlying problem that fuels latent tension between the two communities: namely, uncertainty.

The West's policy towards Kosovo, which was kept in a political limbo for five years by the postponement of a decision on its final status, has failed.

This policy has created an UNMIKSTAN in the heart of Europe, in the words of a local expert (from the name of the UN mission in Kosovo, UNMIK), in which peace is observed with arms.

In this political no-man's land, Albanians and Serbs have been allowed to dangerously feed their own parallel - and very different - hopes for the final status of the province.

But although its illusion of seeing a peaceful multi-ethnic Kosovo emerge from the ashes of wars and five years of armed peace has gone up with the smoke of houses burned in the 17-19 March clashes, the EU sticks to the 'standards before status' policy.

Under this, the final status will only be negotiated once democratic standards of a multi-ethnic society are being respected across the province.

Following the clashes, EU politicians - with a few exceptions - avoided questioning the West's policy towards the province.

However, it has become increasingly clear that it has failed to prevent inter-ethnic violence.

Postponing a negotiation on the province's final status for so long - the issue was only planned to be addressed by mid-2005, six years after the UN moved in - has transformed Kosovo into a failed state (or shall we say 'territory'?) in which crime, drugs and weapons trafficking have been flourishing.

Even more dangerously, perhaps, the two ethnic groups' clashing political hopes for a final status have also flourished amid this ambiguity: Albanians have become increasingly confident about achieving independence from Serbia, while Serbs have cultivated hopes about autonomy in a Kosovo that remains part of their mother-country.

Since 1999, EU capitals - as well as Washington - have talked themselves into believing that their Balkan policy was a stunning success and failed to see the underground tension that was waiting to explode at any moment.

While the aim of achieving a democratic and peaceful inter-ethnic society should not be dropped, the method for getting there must be questioned. The 'standards before status' policy should be changed.

The West should remain uncompromising in respect of standards such as human rights, democratic principles and protection of minorities but it should not postpone a negotiation on the province's status until these are fulfilled.

On the contrary, bringing to an end the present ambiguity over Kosovo's status may create better conditions for the respect of democratic values.

First, the present policy prolongs uncertainty. It does not link the respect of standards to a certain status (ie independence for Kosovo or larger autonomy within Serbia) but only to a future discussion on the final status.

As a result, the motivation for Albanians, who represent the majority in the province, to respect the standards imposed on them, is unclear and weak, as they do not know whether in the end this is going to lead them to what they want, ie independence.

Their compliance is influenced by different interpretations of what they feel the reward would be for their fulfilment of conditions.

What the United Nations is doing in Kosovo is an experiment in state-building without a state.

And the ambiguity over statehood has prevented the establishment of sound democratic institutions and the emergence of conciliatory views on minorities.

In addition, it has led to an economically assisted society, drip-fed and dependent on foreign aid.

The role of the economic breakdown of the province in spurring civil unrest must not be underestimated.

The West should hand over more responsibility to local authorities in managing their own affairs, as foreign aid and international management are no recipe for kick-starting an economy.

Therefore, while it must maintain the requirement for high standards, the West must bring a quick resolution to Kosovo's status.

However, bigger political troubles arise for the EU when it comes to the issue of deciding on a final status, as member states have so far sent a confusing message - often different from the US', which nonchalantly gave hints about a possible independence of Kosovo.

Although the idea of retracing borders is anathema to the EU, as it could cause a domino effect of territorial claims in the Balkans, some European leaders have spoken in the past of a semi-autonomous status for the province.

But others have expressed support for a 'cantonization', or sub-division, of Kosovo into ethnic sectors, as proposed by Serbia.

It will not be easy for the EU to speak with one voice on the final status of Kosovo - and it will perhaps be even more difficult to find a common tone with Washington on the matter.

But the best and most forward-looking message member states can give to the people in the embattled province is that Kosovo's final status will involve it being part of the European Union.

Commentary.

• Primary Source

http://eeas.europa.eu/kosovo/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/kosovo/index_en.htm

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