Bargaining in institutionalized settings: The case of Turkish reforms

By analyzing the case of a bargaining situation in an institutionalized setting, which derives from Turkey’s reform process in a sensitive issue area (civil—military relations), this study assesses the explanatory power of competing models of bargaining: rational, normative, and discursive/argumentative .The bargaining outcome in this case was puzzling because despite the existence of a strongly pro-status quo veto player (i.e. the military), the bargaining processes led to a new status quo.This study shows that the veto player simply failed to prevent a shift to a new status quo because such an action would do substantial damage to the military’s ideational concerns (normative entrapment). The rational model remains under-socialized, while the discursive model is over-socialized in analyzing this bargaining situation. Although the normative model sheds more light on this puzzling outcome, a synthesis between normative and rational models would provide us with much better insight.