Baltic politics. All change

The benefits of instability

THIS week Lithuania was putting the finishing touches to its 12th government in 14 years of independence - or the 13th, if you count a three-day caretaker administration in 1991. Neighbouring Latvia has its ninth prime minister in 11 years, Aigars Kalvitis, appointed last week by President VairaVike-Freiberga. The third Baltic state, Estonia, is calmer: its seventh post-Soviet prime minister, Juhan Parts, was elected in March 2003 and could even stay for a full four-year parliamentary term, a first for the Baltics since the collapse of communism.

What a mess, you might say. But the striking thing is how well it has been contained. Very little spills over into policymaking. This year all three Baltic countries joined NATO and the European Union, winning high marks for being ready. Estonia led post-communist Europe in its economic reforms. For five years the Baltics have chalked up higher growth rates than other EU hopefuls such as Poland and Hungary.

How so? One answer is that the Baltic countries had the strongest incentive to reform when communism collapsed, because they were in the worst shape. Unlike Poland or Hungary, they were inside the Soviet Union, subject to the full force of collectivisation and Stalinist central planning. Their economies had to be rebuilt from scratch. Second, the goal of EU accession dictated a ready-made programme of policies for all governments to follow. The Baltics did so the most doggedly, for fear that failure might push them back into Russia's orbit.

But comparison with Romania, the least successful of central Europe's reformers, now suggests a third reason. There, a botched election last week and doubts over the country's readiness to join the EU in 2007 are letting light into a system of government enmeshed in webs of clientelism and corruption extending from the ruling socialist party, whose bosses have held or shared power for ten of the past 14 years.

Corruption taints Baltic politics too, especially in Latvia and Lithuania. But because Baltic governments are weak and fast-changing, they are also limited in their ability to advance their financial backers' interests. In short, they have had less scope to do harm than to do good. Stability may be a virtue, but competition can be even better.