| Author (Person) | Philippart, Eric |
|---|---|
| Series Title | European Voice |
| Series Details | Vol.8, No.4, 31.1.02, p13 |
| Publication Date | 31/01/2002 |
| Content Type | News |
|
Date: 31/01/02 In the first of a regular series of articles by experts at the Centre for European Policy Studies think-tank (CEPS), senior associate fellow Eric Philippart examines the ramifications of the Laeken mandate for the new Convention on Treaty reform ON 15 December 2001, the European Council adopted a 'declaration on the future of the European Union' that defines the format of the second phase paving the way to a new round of Treaty changes in the EU. The Convention formula designed in Laeken is unprecedented in the history of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). The main challenge at this stage is to examine the opportunities and constraints ensuing from the type of mandate, institutions and processes chosen, in order to assess if the new approach is likely to deliver clear recommendations, shape the IGC agenda and output, or even lead to the adoption of a constitution for EU citizens. The mandate assigned to the new body - to consider the key issues arising for the Union's future development and try to identify the various possible responses - is standard. The Convention was not, however, given carte blanche insofar as it must achieve its goals 'in the light' of 56 substantive questions. Besides the symbolically very important reference to the long-run possibility of adopting a constitution, the declaration innovated more in terms of the number of institutional issues under review than in terms of the topics listed. These are: definition of competence; simplification of EU instruments and Treaties; democracy, transparency and efficiency. Many of them had already been envisaged during the two previous IGCs. Looking at the selection of issues and the formulation of some questions, it also appears that there are clear biases aimed at shaping the Convention's proposals. It is, for instance, particularly clear for the set of questions concerning the role of the national parliaments. Postulating the existence of a problem, the declaration only lists anti-supranational options, phrased in a maximalist way. This puts the proponents of other approaches in the uncomfortable position of having to pick the lesser of these 'evils' or appear as uncompromising ultras. All in all, the European Council has marked out the Convention's agenda. The mandate is encompassing, but formulated in an open way. In addition to giving the Convention the option to ignore or add questions, it also invites it to think big (constitution-building) and 'out of the box' (no taboos). From an institutional angle, never before has the preparatory framework been so large or included so many components. The Convention has 105 members, as many alternates, plus 13 observers. It is flanked by a secretariat and a 'forum' of organisations representing civil society. Among participants to the Convention, no less than ten categories of different status - some speaking on behalf of their institution, others in a personal capacity - can be distinguished. The Convention is composed of European Council appointees (the chair and the two vice-chairs); representatives of governments of the member states as well as of the accession candidate countries; representatives of the European Commission; members of the European Parliament, members of the national parliaments of the member states and of the candidate countries. For the first time national parliamentarians are fully associated with the IGC preparation and candidate states are directly involved. The system's core, the 'praesidium', is dominated by EU constituents - a major novelty. Assuredly quite large, it is less heterogeneous than the Convention insofar as the candidate countries have no guaranteed representation at that level. Even if the executive grip over it remains strong, no national government is directly represented. The praesidium is overwhelmingly 'European': 10 members out of 12 have been designated by EU institutions or have a seat because they are the voice of the Council of Ministers. That feature is reinforced by the fact that the Convention secretariat, instead of being entirely provided by the general secretariat of the Council, will also include staff detached from the Commission and the European Parliament. As for the processes, depending on one's view of the virtues of centralisation, the Laeken formula is potentially very loose or inclusive. Restricted to drawing conclusions from the public debate for the opening of the Convention and liaising with the European Council, the exclusive prerogatives of the chairman are limited. The triumvirate (chair & vice-chairs) as such has none. It is for the praesidium to lend impetus to the deliberation process while the Convention is supposed to draw up the final document and bring the exercise to a close. Such decision-making and drafting arrangements are adequate if the exercise is mainly about identifying, clarifying and ranking options. If clear recommendations are expected, the processes are very loose as no mechanism is provided to focus the mind of the participants and instil consensus. By saying that the final document 'may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved', the Laeken declaration has put the emphasis on the 'listing' approach. Ending up with a list of options cannot be considered a failure. When expectation is set at such a level (in line with traditional standards of international diplomacy), little pressure can be put on recalcitrant delegates. The processes are also a priori very open, relatively compact and transparent. A selection of representatives from the civil society (via the forum) and the European Council (via regular reports enabling the heads of state or government to give their views collectively) will be closely involved in the deliberation process. All documents are bound to be in the public domain, without restriction. As for the duration and intensity of the process, the Convention should not last more than one year. Its plenary sessions should, on average, not exceed two days per month (approximately the frequency of the Council meetings). A little more than 20 days does not seem much to draft a constitution's proposal, considering the volume of legislation the Council manages to produce in the same time-frame. If the objective is to finish the IGC under the Italian presidency, there is no possibility of stretching the Convention's timetable. So, what could we expect from such a mix? The new approach certainly has potential. But will the main actors have the capacity to take advantage of a relatively open mandate and the long-term constitutional ambition; the cumulated legitimacy of the Convention; the political weight and skills of the triumvirate; the dynamics of an 'unionised' core; and the close links with the European Council? Will they manage to overcome the heterogeneity of the assembly, the looseness and openness of the processes with the ensuing risk of disruptive tactics, modest expectation and a tight time-frame? To maximize the chance of success, at its opening session, the assembly should show that its main ambition is to produce precise recommendations, and not a catalogue of options. It should also specify who will produce the drafts and draw the Convention to a close. As shown by the Community history, an efficient way to structure the debate would be to give the monopoly of initiative and drafting to one (individual or collective) player. On one hand, caution must be exerted against presidentialist drift (especially when it results in the development of parallel structures). On the other, a body the size of the praesidium is a big one to play the role of initiator and concluder. The triumvirate would have been a good option if it had not been unilaterally appointed by the European Council. The Convention, of course, could be invited to confirm the choice of the European Council, but it would mean taking the risk of further undermining the triumvirate's legitimacy. The solution may be to mandate the triumvirate, flanked by a couple of delegates designated by the assembly. The triumvirate should, however, be responsible - in close consultation with the praesidium - for establishing that consensus exists. Even in the absence of any official role at these levels, provided they work as a team and secure the collaboration of national executives and MEPs for managing national parliaments, these three men are in a good position to exert stewardship over the work of the Convention. Formal votes should be avoided, inter alia because of the balance between the various contingents. In order to lock-in the IGC, shape its agenda and allow for a swifter and better end than in Amsterdam or Nice, it will not be sufficient to deliver a clear set of recommendations. The Convention will need to secure maximum media coverage and convince as many governments as possible to endorse all or parts of its conclusions in the position paper they will each release on the verge of the IGC. The fact that the interval between the end of the Convention and the start of the IGC is minimal should help in that respect. As for the constitutional step, not too much should be expected from the work of a non-constituent assembly, followed by a conference of governments which will negotiate Treaty changes in accordance with article 48 of the Treaty on European Union.
A more detailed version of this analysis will appear in the future on the CEPS website, http://www.ceps.be. Major feature. Author examines the ramifications of the Laeken mandate for the new Convention on Treaty Reform. |
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