After the revolution – calm reigns in Ukraine

Date: 30/06/05

Six months after the Orange revolution, politics in Ukraine is surprisingly mundane - which is both encouraging and a little disappointing.

In a matter of weeks, Ukraine's revolution brought the country out of the international doghouse, significantly closer to NATO and opened up the albeit distant prospect of EU membership.

Yet, six months into the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, there is disappointment. Much of that is misplaced. A democratic revolution - a revolution achieved through elections and the courts - comes at a price. Parliaments remain packed with opponents. Deals cut to establish a united opposition ensure an ideologically divided government. Deals cut with the former government to ensure a peaceful transfer of power slow down reform.

In Ukraine, those problems common to revolutions such as Serbia's and Georgia's were compounded by fear, that the country could fall apart and that Yushchenko, already a victim of poisoning, could fall victim to assassination, as Serbia's then prime minister Zoran Djindjic did.

The threat of Ukraine's collapse now seems a mirage. Ukraine's political scene is fragmented and its leadership seemingly split, but the tensions are less acrimonious and fundamental than they were in the 18-party coalition led in Serbia by Djindjic and Vojislav Kostunica. Nor are there the doubts about the loyalty of the military and the secret services or the air of political violence so evident in Serbia.

In fact, Ukrainian politics now looks surprisingly hum-drum, dominated by disputes about price-capping and privatisation and fears about inflation. After five years of such mundane business, Ukraine might have progressed farther than Serbia has since 2000 and even as far as other states in the Western Balkans - countries that, as it happens, are knocking on the EU's doors.

But first the government must win elections in March 2006. Serbia offers a warning: in 2003, the supporters of Slobodan Milosevic made a near-comeback both in the presidential and parliamentary elections.

So far, the government looks safe. Voters should sense numerous changes for the better. A report by the New York-based non-governmental organisation Freedom House noted improvements in all but two aspects of public life.

Gratitude and self-interest may also bring votes, since the government is raising welfare spending by 50%.

A wild move? Not necessarily. Politically, the government probably had little choice. Yushchenko's presidential rival, Viktor Yanukovych, had as prime minister promised most of these increases; honouring Yanukovych's promises will make it harder for the old regime to stage a comeback. And economically, Yushchenko, who made his name as a central banker, can safely be expected to act to curb inflation.

Even one of the government's biggest disputes - about what to do with assets effectively given away by ex-president Leonid Kuchma - may win it votes. Here, we see a clash between the more liberal Yushchenko and the statist tendencies of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. That tension may be welcome to the many Ukrainians who associate liberalisation with the wild capitalism of the 1990s, and the debate reduces the risk that Ukrainians will believe the new elite simply wants the old elite's property for itself.

The cumulative effect of these improvements and policies (plus residual revolutionary sentiments) should ensure victory in March 2006. Three times more Ukrainians are happy with the government than are unhappy. Yushchenko remains very popular and Tymoshenko's popularity is rising. If they win, the revolution will be safer.

It will also be embedded in a healthier political system, a new parliamentary system.

Still, Ukrainians can justifiably feel disappointment. Policy differences have already scuppered hopes that the EU might swiftly recognise Ukraine as a market economy.

The government has sometimes behaved too like its predecessor, most obviously when Tymoshenko called journalists "hired killers" for pursuing the justice minister. The scandal-plagued Justice Minister Roman Zvarych has moved too slowly on judicial reform. Unless he acts faster, trials against oligarchs and the re-privatisation (or re-nationalisation) process may end in a mess or be interpreted as the Yukos case has been in Russia: as a vendetta rather than as a legal correction of past distortions.

Ultimately, the main reason for disappointment is that Yushchenko has not made full use of the few months in which he will enjoy Kuchma's sweeping powers. Soon, many of his powers will pass to the prime minister.

Yet it is Yushchenko who has the virtues Ukraine most needs at this unique moment: moral authority plus great constitutional powers; gravitas and expertise, and progressive ideas plus popularity, modesty and cautiousness but also courage.

• Andrew Gardner is the managing editor of Transitions Online, a news magazine covering the post-communist world. A longer version of this article can be found on Transitions Online (www.tol.org).

Article takes a look at politics in Ukraine six months after the 'Orange revolution' of December 2004.

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