Afghanistan’s weakest link

Rebuilding an Afghan police force is proving an uphill struggle, writes Francesco Guarascio.

A patrol in the southern Afghan district of Uruzgan near the town of Chora: several tanks, 30 Dutch soldiers supported by a similar number of Afghan National Army colleagues. And the usual ambush of the insurgents in a region infested by the Taliban. In other words, a normal day. No casualties this time, but a lot to complain about for the troops from NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). "The ambush took place next to the local police station. Nobody came to help us," says a young Dutch soldier involved in the incident. "The Afghan soldiers are very reliable and they fight with us since the beginning, but I definitely don’t trust the Afghan police. I don’t understand who they work for."

This is an opinion shared by many in Afghanistan. After years of training and financial support from the international community, the Afghan army is now able to take part actively in the war against the Taliban insurgency. It can field more than 30,000 soldiers, two-thirds of whom are deployed at any given time. Although the Afghan army still needs new weapons and equipment, it is already strong enough to be feared by insurgents, who seek to avoid it in combat.

The Afghan police is a different story. Underpaid and corrupt, policemen are the weak link in Afghanistan’s security. "There is a real concern that Isaf’s military success might be neutralised by the Afghan police," says Nicholas Lunt, a spokesperson for Isaf.

The role of the non-military security forces is crucial. They have to hold and secure the villages ‘cleared’ of the Taliban by coalition troops. And, even more sensitively, it is their task to eradicate the production of opium poppies, which is flourishing in the south of the country and which is the Taliban’s main source of revenue.

These are very serious challenges, but the under-equipped and poorly trained police struggle to keep up with the task. Policemen are inclined to accept bribes and are reluctant to put their lives at risk against the insurgents.

"We had a disproportionate development of the army rather than the police," says Lunt. "Now we need a dramatic upsurge in police capacity building."

Figures illustrate this imbalance clearly. In the Kandahar province, the traditional stronghold of the Taliban insurgency, around 10,000 army recruits are trained by Isaf instructors. They are safely housed in a new compound near the Kandahar Airport, where about 10,000 Isaf soldiers are deployed, outside the city. They usually do not go to Kandahar City, unless escorted by considerable firepower. The frontline in the city is left to approximately 300-400 policemen, deployed in 13 police sub-stations around a city of about 400,000 inhabitants. The Afghan official who runs sub-station 9, built on a hill offering a nice view of the city and the beautiful blue dome of its mosque, does not seem concerned. "We have never seen Taliban in the area," he says.

For a salary of $70 (€50) a month, recently raised to $100 but often only paid with huge delays, it is hard to ask these men to be heroes. A task made even more difficult because the enemy they are supposed to fight are usually Pashtun men like themselves.

However, their local origin makes them potentially an extremely useful asset for spreading stability in the troubled south of Afghanistan. Only a Pashtun policeman can convince a Pashtun farmer that he has to give up the lucrative poppy business, which produces opium, and to replace it with a less valuable crop.

This is definitely not a task for foreign Isaf soldiers, who are already unpopular enough with the locals. And it is not a task for the Afghan army either.

But since Afghan security forces are often involved in fights with locals the policy is to send Pashtun soldiers to the northern regions and Tajiks and Uzbeks to the south, explains Gul Aqa Nahib, the top general of the Afghan National Army in the south. To confirm the rule, Aqa Nahib does not speak in Pashtun but uses Dari, a language alien to southern Afghanistan.

• Francesco Guarascio is a freelance journalist based in Brussels.

Rebuilding an Afghan police force is proving an uphill struggle, writes Francesco Guarascio.