A unique opportunity to change Europe’s institutional architecture

Date: 16/01/03

By Ben Crum and Wouter Coussens

The Convention on the EU's future can solve the Union's leadership problem by unifying the Commission and Council presidencies.

NEXT week, the European Convention will at last turn to the fundamental debate on the future decision-making procedures of the EU.

Much attention will focus on one issue: the presidency of the Council.

This is partly because of the fascinating image of one person coming to represent the Union and turning into the European equivalent of Bush or Putin. At the same time, however, the organisation of the presidency also serves as a microcosm reflecting the key questions pertaining to the future institutional architecture as a whole.

Above all, a reorganisation of the presidency is required to secure the Union's effectiveness. The six-monthly rotation of the presidency among the member states has turned into a source of instability and discontinuity. The responsibilities of the presidency have become so big that one can hardly expect a government to take them up alongside its normal tasks.

Also, the capacity of the member states to take up the presidency varies, especially when it comes to representing the Union in the wider world.

Moreover, presidencies establish their own priorities, which do not always fit neatly in the EU agenda, while the follow-up of decisions taken under previous incumbents is often insufficient.

However, reorganising the presidency is more than just a matter of increasing efficacy. It also needs to be firmly embedded in the Union's institutional balance. The current system has the merit that it prevents the Council chair from developing into a genuinely political body. A reform may lead to exactly the opposite and thereby challenge the position of the European Commission and the European Parliament.

Furthermore, the presidency cannot be strengthened without considering its relation to the European citizenry. Indeed, reforming the presidency may offer an opportunity to increase the visibility of the Union and the engagement of the people.

Thus, any reorganisation needs to be assessed from three perspectives: effectiveness, institutional balance and democracy.

The solution getting most attention so far has been the proposal launched by France's Jacques Chirac, the UK's Tony Blair and Spain's José María Aznar to replace the six-monthly rotation system by a permanent president of the EU chosen by the European Council.

Besides chairing the European Council, such a person would be key to the development of the Union's foreign and defence policies and represent the Union at the highest international level. Notably, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the chairman of the Convention on the future of Europe, has commented favourably on this proposal.

However, not everyone is convinced by the proposal for a permanent Council president.

It is feared that such a person might strengthen the Council over the communitarian institutions, and the big member states over the small ones. Hence the "federalist camp" seeks to retain the rotating presidency by proposing to lighten its burden by re-centring it on its procedural responsibilities, while transferring most of its executive tasks to the Commission.

The problem with both these models is that they remain caught in the current opposition between more intergovernmental and more supranational elements in the Union. Since both retain the distinction between the Council presidency and the Commission president, but strengthen one side over the other, they risk undermining the institutional balance in the EU.

Executive leadership in the Union requires a solution that bridges the gap between the two.

More concretely, it has to prevent the emergence of a "parallel Europe" around the Commission and the Council, with two competing administrative structures, both with their own president competing for Union leadership.

Such a solution may be found by merging the presidencies of the European Council and the Commission. Equipped with a double hat, the new leader could restore the relationship of confidence between the two bodies.

Merging the presidencies involves a radical overhaul of the existing EU structure. It is, however, the only way to increase the effectiveness of executive leadership in the Union while respecting the precarious institutional balance on which it is built. Uniting all European executive capacity under one figurehead will clarify the organisation of the EU, and end the present administrative duality.

It will also facilitate a simplification of decision-making procedures and a clear location of the agenda-setting powers.

At the same time, if this model is to be feasible, it is crucial that the president's powers be subject to effective political constraints. Both the European Council and the European Parliament should be able to hold the president and the Commission accountable.

The Council should remain the final decision-centre for certain executive matters (Common Foreign Security Policy, EMU, police and judicial cooperation), although the Commission should be more involved in the administration of these matters. In terms of external presence, having the president assisted by a double-hatted foreign secretary looks like a reasonable compromise.

Finally, while the president should be fully accountable to Council and Parliament, the Union's balance would be much distorted if the president were to command a stable majority in either house, leaving the remaining minority alienated from executive power.

This consideration combines with democratic considerations to suggest that the president be endowed with a separate legitimacy, distinct from that of either the Parliament or the Council.

The president might thus be directly elected by the citizenry or, during a transitory period, by a congress composed of national and European parliamentarians. Such election procedures should be calibrated by assigning appropriate weights to the national shares and by granting Council and Parliament some power over the nomination process.

It is up to the Convention to seize the unique opportunity it has to rebuild EU structure. If it wants an effective exercise of executive powers at Union level, it will need to organise strong, visible and unified leadership.

By adopting the option of a democratised unified president, the Convention can provide a long-term solution to the current leadership problem of the European Union, which - if appropriately fine-tuned - can meet the triple challenge of rendering the Union more effective and democratic, while respecting the EU's institutional balance.

• Ben Crum is a Marie Curie research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). Wouter Coussens is a researcher at the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI). This article is based upon a CEPS-IRRI working paper, Towards Effective and Accountable Leadership Of The Union, by the same authors.

Authors argue that the Convention on the EU's future can solve the Union's leadership problem by unifying the Commission and Council presidencies.