A lull between the storms

Date: 27/09/03

Was it a real agreement on Europe's future defence or just an effort to be polite?

WHEN European leaders get together, a turn of phrase or subtle change of emphasis can convey their thinking on the future shape of the Union. When the subject is defence, such nuances can also intimate their attitudes to America and NATO, the alliance that is supposed to bind the two sides of the Atlantic together. But it is often difficult for the uninitiated to interpret these smoke-signals. It is especially tough if, as was the case after Britain's Tony Blair, France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schröder met in Berlin on September 20th, the countries differ about what, if anything, was agreed.

The Germans said that the British had changed their minds; the British said they hadn't. The subject was whether the EU should have its own military planning facilities, separate from NATO. (The EU already has its own military staff, but it mainly does broad strategic, rather than operational, planning.) In April, Messrs Chirac and Schröder, along with their counterparts from Belgium and Luxembourg, controversially proposed that such an HQ should be established at Tervuren, a suburb of Brussels - an idea regarded in London and Washington as a small but symbolic step towards the rupturing of NATO. “Tervuren is a symbol of competition” between the EU and NATO, says Nick Burns, America's ambassador to the alliance. This fear - that the Europeans might one day go it alone - explains why some Americans have mixed feelings about the EU's defence effort, even though it could ease America's global burdens.

In principle, Britain is keen on European co-operation in defence: it is one area where Mr Blair really can be in the EU's vanguard. And the idea of some independent planning capability is not in itself anathema: the French-led EU operation in Congo was planned using French facilities. But the British have insisted that the EU should avoid duplicating NATO assets in any way that might undermine the alliance. So, for instance, the EU's embryonic rapid-reaction force and NATO's nascent force are designed to do different jobs. (Africa is one area in which the EU may act alone; others may emerge on the Union's new borders after their shift eastward next year.) In this view, the Europeans don't need a new HQ, because under an agreement reached last year they can use NATO's facilities for bigger operations. They are already relying on NATO assets for their current mission in Macedonia.

The other, related topic on which Mr Blair seemed to have shifted is what, in the EU's elegant jargon, is called “structured co-operation”. This means that the EU's more militarily advanced countries can choose to push ahead with defence co-operation without the others. Britain has hitherto sounded sceptical about that, too. But Mr Blair went along with Mr Schröder when he said that while it would be ideal for everyone to proceed together, if that wasn't possible, structured co-operation would be fine. It may be that Mr Blair has been persuaded that nothing very serious can happen, defence-wise, unless Britain is a part of it; and that this sort of mechanism will be necessary to get anything done after the EU's enlargement.

In any case, Mr Schröder found a form of words, including friendly references to NATO, with which all three leaders could live - for the time being. The hair-splitting will begin at a meeting of defence ministers next week and continue during negotiations over the European constitution, which will lay out the architecture of European defence. Among the all-important details is the location of the putative new planning unit: the British want it to be physically based at NATO's main HQ, which would make it seem much less of a rival than the Tervuren idea. How easy it should be for countries to join in with the structured co-operators, and how accountable they should be to the rest of the Union, must be thrashed out too. There may also be a row over whether the EU should have its own guarantee covering territorial defence. The British say that is NATO's job.

The truce

Berlin was an opportunity for the three leaders to show some goodwill in advance of the thrashing. The other context of their conciliatory meeting, was, of course, the lingering rancour over Iraq.

That rancour is part of the inheritance that awaits Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Dutch foreign minister who will take over as secretary-general of NATO when Lord Robertson, a dogged Scot and the alliance's current chief, steps down at the end of this year. Having seen NATO snubbed by America after September 11th, Lord Robertson made a good fist of defining a role for it in the post-cold war world. NATO is also expanding eastwards, and it recently took over command of the security operation in Kabul, its first “out-of-area” task.

But the internal wrangle over Iraq was, Mr Burns said at the time, “a near-death experience” for the alliance. (NATO is now giving logistical aid to the Polish peacekeeping effort in Iraq, but sending in NATO troops while America, one of its members, retains command, would be tricky.)

Mr Scheffer is known as a good deal-maker. He and his country wobbled over the war without alienating their neighbours. He will need those skills to subdue the mutual suspicions among NATO's member countries: on one side are the Atlanticists who fear that the French camp wants the EU to usurp the alliance; on the other are those who fear NATO may become simply an arm of American foreign policy. Just as importantly, Mr Scheffer will need to lean on his members to meet their promises to buy new and needed hardware, which can get forgotten amid all the posturing.

Report of meetings between the leaders of France, Germany and the UK, Berlin, 20 September 2003.

• Primary Source