| Author (Person) | Booth, Philip |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Institute of Economic Affairs |
| Series Title | Briefing |
| Series Details | September 2016 |
| Publication Date | September 2016 |
| Content Type | Report |
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Executive Summary: + Whatever trade arrangement the UK decides to adopt with the EU post-Brexit, the UK government will have authority over fisheries policy. + Under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), after many years of stock decline, there has been a recent stabilisation and even increase in stocks. However, the CFP is not an effective way for managing fishing rights. + Other countries such as Iceland have more effective policies that lead both to sustainable management and also reduce conflict between different interests. + The UK should adopt a tradable quota share system whereby quotas are allocated as a share of the annual total allowable catch in perpetuity. + Such a system mirrors the way in which property rights on land encourage sustainable farming. + Under such a system the quota-holders have an incentive to agree the total allowable catch to maximise sustainability. + In-shore fisheries might be better managed in other ways with self-management often being more sustainable than government regulation. + Having determined the principles by which the system should operate, there are a number of practical difficulties that need to be addressed. These are important issues, but need not get in the way of the development of an effective and sustainable property-rights based system for allocating fishing rights |
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| Source Link | Link to Main Source https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/IEA-Briefing-Fisheries-.pdf |
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| Subject Categories | Business and Industry |
| Countries / Regions | Europe, United Kingdom |
