| Author (Person) | Whelan, Peter |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| Series Title | European Competition Journal |
| Series Details | Volume 5, Number 3, Pages 823-845 |
| Publication Date | September 2009 |
| ISSN | 1744-1056 |
| Content Type | Journal Article |
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Introduction: "In order to negotiate their contractual arrangements effectively, retailers may decide to divulge certain sensitive information to their respective suppliers. This information may include any of a wide number of data relating to their future commercial strategies; examples that readily come to mind are the prices atwhich the retailers will sell their goods and/or services in the future, their future promotional activities and their investment plans. In this context, an exchange of information is capable of being rationalised in the absence of a desire to disrupt or distort market forces.
"In the first instance, the article considers the current legal treatment of direct competitor-to-competitor information exchanges,thereby identifying the types of information that are suspect in this context. Following on from this, the article then examines how the addition of the vertical element (ie the hub) affects the legal assessment at issue; in doing so, it examines the circumstances in which an exchange of information through a “hub and spoke” arrangement can be deemed to be a de facto horizontal exchange. Taken together, then, both of these steps identify what information should not be passed on to suppliers by retailers and in what circumstances. Such knowledge would be of obvious benefit to market actors who wish to stay within the antitrust laws." |
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| Source Link | Link to Main Source https://doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v5n3.823 |
| Subject Categories | Internal Markets |
| Subject Tags | Competition Law | Policy |
| Keywords | Antitrust | Cartels | Dominant Position | Market Abuse |
