Business preferences in international investment policymaking : does European business lobby for international investment agreements?

Abstract:

Does European business lobby for international investment agreements? In the public debate, international investment policymaking has become almost synonymous with a policy domain subject to an undue influence of business on policy outcomes.

This paper argues that business preferences and lobbying have little effect on outcomes in international investment policy. The perceived beneficial effects of international investment agreements are small, distant and uncertain, which results in limited business lobbying. Instead, bureaucratic politics seems to decisively shape international investment policymaking in Europe.

The paper confirms these hypotheses by means of a detailed assessment of German and EU international investment policymaking before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in-depth case studies of major international investment negotiations and an evaluation of the changing design of European international investment agreements. It concludes with a discussion of the TTIP negotiations as an important outlier to the generally observed passivity of European business in this domain.