The war of nerves with Iran – consequences for the South Caucasus and Russia

Abstract:

Tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme have risen considerably in recent months. This has been visible in numerous threats of – and much speculation about – an imminent Israeli (and US) attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.

In this context, the support for the attacks that the countries of the South Caucasus (and Azerbaijan in particular) could provide has been the subject of lively debate, as has been the prospect of a Russian political and military offensive in the Caucasus in response to the attacks on Iran. It seems that the ongoing war campaign in the media has been aimed primarily at putting pressure on Iran and the international community to find a political solution to the Iranian problem. This also applies to the Caucasus’s involvement in the campaign. Given the outcome of the Istanbul round of talks on a political solution to the Iranian issue (14 April), which warrants moderate optimism, the threat of a conflict now appears more distant and this also indirectly proves the effectiveness of the campaign.

The war of nerves with Iran, however, is already now actually affecting the stability of the Southern Caucasus. While it seems that Azerbaijan is not Israel’s partner in the preparations to attacks, and that there is no real link between the Iranian problem and the ongoing and planned movements of Russian troops in the Caucasus, the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are indeed high. Moreover, the global image of the Caucasus is deteriorating, the USA’s position in the region is becoming more complicated, and Russia’s room for manoeuvre is expanding.